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Human Rights in Northern Ireland: 
Ireland v. the United Kingdom 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 18, 1978, ten years into the present conflict in Northern Ire-
land! and amidst a developing worldwide interest in the treatment of political 
1. (Editor's note: Spelling in all quotations from British sources has been changed to reflect 
American usage. Where this has been done, brackets have been placed around the changed letter 
or word). The current conflict in Nor~hern Ireland has been an explosive topic of debate and the 
subject of numerous writings over the past ten years. Unfortunately, space does not permit a 
comprehensive discussion of this complc;x and still developing situation. Ho";'ever, a brief outline 
follows. 
In the early decades of this century, Ireland (including the six northeastern counties which now 
constitute Northern Ireland) waged a struggle for independence against the .United Kingdom. 
The struggle culminated in the partition of Ireland by an act of Parliament. Government of 
Ireland Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67. Under the provisions of this statute, the six northeastern 
counties of the island remained part of the United Kingdom, becoming known as Northern Ire-
land. Meanwhile, the twenty-six southern counties became a free state with dominion status in 
1922, Irish Free State Act, 1922, 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 2, and eventually obtained complete in-
dependence as a Republic in 1949. Ireland Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 41. For a discussion 
of partition and of the constitutional history of Ireland, see N. MANSERGH, THE IRISH QUESTION 
1840-1921 (3d ed. 1975); T. MOODY, THE ULSTER QUESTION 1603-1973 (1974). 
Since the time of partition, the dominant and ruling population in Northern Ireland, holding 
approximately a two-thirds majority, has been Protestant. See Lowry, Terrorism and Human Rights: 
Counter-Insurgency and Necessity at Common Law, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 49, 49 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as Lowry, Terrorism). The Protestant majority has been largely Loyalist, preferring con-
tinued unity with the United Kingdom rather than independence or reunification with the largely 
Catholic Republic of Ireland. See generally M. FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE 
STATE (1976); R. ROSE, GOVERNING WITHOUT CONSENSUS (1971) [hereinafter cited as ROSE). 
On the other hand, the one-third minority in Northern Ireland has been Catholic and mainly 
Nationalist or Republican in its political philosophy. Lowry, supra, at 49. Throughout the sixty 
year history of Northern Ireland, many members of the minority population have actively pur-
sued their goal of independence. They have often resorted to the use of force and violence as a 
means to achieve this goal. See generally C. O'BRIEN, STATES OF IRELAND (1972) [hereinafter cited 
as O'BRIEN); R. HULL, THE IRISH TRIANGLE: CONFUCT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1976); L. DE 
PAOR, DIVIDED ULSTER (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as DE PAOR); G. MACEoIN, NORTHERN 
IRELAND: CAPTIVE OF HISTORY (1974). Over the years, such forceful attempts to gain in-
dependence have usually been encouraged and supported, if not led, by the clandestine Irish 
Republican Army (IRA). The IRA is a Republican organization composed mainly of members 
of the minority population. The expressed aim of the IRA has been to obtain a severance of the 
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detainees,2 the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in 
Ireland v. the United Kingdom. 3 The decision rendered in this case is the final 
phase of a six year legal process involving an interpretation and application of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (Convention).4 
ties between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. See generally T. COOGAN, THE I.R.A. 
(1970);J. BELL, THE SEGRET ARMY: A HIS~RY OF THE I.R.A. (1970). In the past, the IRA has 
pursued its goal through sporadic guerilla campaigns. Lowry, Tmorism, supra, at 49-50. 
The majority, based on its monopoly of the government and assisted by the United Kingdom, 
has countered such campaigns through the introduction and application of emergency powers 
which permit detention and internment of suspected terrorists. See § III infra. In so doing, the ma-
jority was motivated by its desire to maintain its position of ascendancy. 
The conflict in Northern Ireland flared anew in the late 1960's. At that time, the problem 
focused upon the attempts of the minority to gain the same civil, social and political rights en-
joyed by the majority. Disturbances and social unrest followed on the heels of civil rights 
demonstrations. The violence escalated to the point where, in the early-to-mid 1970's, shootings 
and bombings became a fact oflife in Northern Ireland. For an excellent discussion of this period, 
see generally LONDON SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, ULSTER (1972) [hereinafter cited as LSTIT]. 
In addition, for excellent accounts of the early years ofthe current conflict see K. BOYLE, T. HAD-
DEN & P. HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND(1975); M. HASTINGS, 
BARRICADES IN BELFAST: THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1970); S. WIN· 
CHESTER, NORTHERN IRELAND IN CRISIS (1975); Lowry & Spjut, The European Convention and 
Human Rights in Northern Ireland, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 251, 252-57 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as Lowry & Spjut]. 
The level of violence and terrorist activity reached the point where the decision was made, after 
consultation with the government of the United Kingdom, to reintroduce the emergency powers 
of detention and internment in August 1971. LSTIT, supra, at 260-70. For a discussion of deien-
tion and internment as they operated during the early 1970's, see S III infra. 
2. Over the past twenty years, non-governmental organizations (NGO's) such as Amnesty In-
ternational (AI) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have worked to in-
crease public awareness of the plight of political prisoners. Forsythe, Political Prisoners: The lAw 
and Politics oj Protee/ion, 9 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 295, 295 (1976). One of AI's stated objectives 
is to secure the international observance of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.2) 71, U.N. Doc. Al810 (1948) [hereinafter 
cited as Declaration], by "opposing by all appropriate means the imposition and infliction of 
death penalties and torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of 
prisoners or other detained or restricted persons whether or not they have used or advocated 
violence." STATUTE OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL art. 1( c)( 1975). For a concise history of AI, see 
ScobIe & Wiseberg, Human Rights NCO's: Noles Toward Comparative Analysis, 9 REVUE DES DROITS 
DE L'HoMME [R.D.H.] 611, 622-24 (No.4, 1976). For a discussion of what measures the United 
Nations has taken to protect the rights of political prisoners, see Burke, New United Nations Pro-
cedure /0 Protect Prisoners and Other Del4inees, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 201 (1976). 
3. [1978] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS·602 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights) (judgment). 
This contains a brief discussion of the facts in this case and a summary of the judgment. A resolu-
tion of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the judg-
ment of the European Court of Human Rights (Court). Resolution (78) 35, [1978] Y.B. EUR. 
CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 648 [hereinafter cited as Resolution]. A copy of the complete text of 
the judgment may be obtained from the Registrar, European Court of Human Rights, Council of 
Europe, Strasbourg, France. All page references to this case will be to this complete text of the 
judgment [hereinafter cited as Judgment]. 
4. Nov. 4,1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter cited as Convention]. See generally EUROPEAN 
CONYENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED TEXTS (11th ed. 1976). This volume also con-
_ tains, inter alia, the Rules of Procedure of the European Commission of Human Rights and the 
Rules of Court of the European Court of Human Rights (Both English and French copies are 
available from the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France). 
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The Government of Ireland commenced the process by filing its interstate 
application with the European Commission of Human Rights (Commission) 
in December 1971. 5 In its application, the Irish Government alleged that 
many individuals detained in Northern Ireland under emergency powers of 
the United Kingdom had been subjected to ill-treatment and torture by the 
security forces. 6 In addition, the application alleged that the emergency 
powers violated the Convention and that such powers had been administered 
in a discriminatory and political manner.7 The application alleged violations 
of Articles 1, 2, 3, 5,6,14 and 15 of the Convention.s 
The report of the Commission, adopted on January 25, 1976, confirmed 
several breaches of the Convention by the Government of the United 
Kingdom. 9 On March 10, 1976, the case was referred to the European Court 
5. Application No. 5310171, (1972) Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 76 (Eur. Comm. of 
Human Rights) (decision on admissibility) [hereinafter cited as (1972) YEARBOOK]. The objects 
of the claim, as stated in the application, were as follows: 
1. To ensure that the respondent Government will secure to everyone in Northern Ire-
land the rights and freedoms defined in ... Arts. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 14 of the Conven-
tion; 
2. To bring to the attention of the Commission breaches of Arts. I, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 14 of 
the Convention by the respondent Government in Northern Ireland; 
3. To determine the compatibility with the Convention of certain legislative measures 
and administrative practices of the respondent Government in Northern Ireland; 
4. To ensure the observance of the legal engagements and obligations undertaken by 
the respondent Government in the Convention. 
/d. at 94. 
6. /d. at 76. 
7. Id. at 76, 78. 
8. /d. The applicant government (Ireland) also alleged a breach of Article 2 (right to life) ofthe 
Convention, but the European Commission of Human Rights [hereinafter Commission) 
declared this part of the application inadmissible under Article 27(3) for failure to first exhaust all 
domestic remedies available, as required by Article 26 of the Convention. (1972) YEARBOOK, 
sufJra note 5, at 240, 242. Set the discussion of the domestic remedies rule at note 47 infra. The ap-
plication of the Irish Government was declared partly admissible on October I, 1972. See [1972] 
YEARBOOK, sufJra note 5, at 78. 
9. Ireland v. the United Kingdom, (1976) Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 512 (Eur. 
Comm. of Human Rights) (Report of the Commission). A copy of the complete text is available 
from the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France. All page references to the Report will be to this 
complete text [hereinafter cited as Report). The Report was made public on September 2, 1976. 
The procedure followed by the Commission in reaching its conclusions is concisely summar-
ized in Boyle & Hannum, Ireland in Strasbourg: Final Decisions in tM Northern Irish Proceedings &jore 
tIrI European Commission of Human Rights, 11 IRISH ]UR. 243 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Boyle & 
Hannum): 
The Irish Government submitted written evidence in respect of 228 cases of alleged iII-
treatment, 16 of which were ultimately examined in detail by the Commission as "il-
lustrative" cases. Evidence in these cases consisted of oral evidence by the alleged vic-
tims, security force witnesses, and medical experts. In addition, the Commission 
received written comments from both parties on 41 further cases which were supported 
by some form of medical evidence. Specific findings were reached only with respect to 
the 16 illustrative cases .... 
/d. at 247. This work also provides an excellent discussion of the Commission's Report. See also 
0' Boyle, Torture and Emergency Provisions Undrt tIrI European Convention on Human Rights: Irt!land v. tM 
United KingdDm, 71 AM.]. INT'L L. 674 (1977) [hereinafter cited as O'Boyle). For a statement of 
the Commission's decision, see note 238 infra. 
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of Human Rights (Court) by the Irish Government. IO The Government of 
Ireland requested confirmation of the Commission's findings and also sought 
a determination of further breaches of the Convention. II 
This Comment will present an analysis of the Court's decision in Ireland v. 
the United Kingdom. Initially, the author will present a concise outline of the 
relevant principles, procedures and institutions of the Convention. After set-
ting out the factual background of the case, an analysis of the Court's judg-
ment will be provided. Finally, the ramifications of the Court's judgment in 
light of recent developments in Northern Ireland will be discussed. The author 
concludes that the effect of the Court's decision, with respect to the future pro-
tection of human rights in Northern Ireland, has been diminished due to the 
apparent continuation of human rights violations in that province. 
II. THE CONVENTION 
A. The CoLlective Enforcement oj Human Rights 
Although the principle of respect for human rights had been established in 
international law by the United Nations Charterl2 and further defined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights," an effective means for implemen-
ting and enforcing such rights within the European community did not exist 
prior to the establishment of the Convention. Historically, the protection of 
human rights has been regarded as the concern of the state. I. The European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
was adopted to fill this void. The Convention provides for the "collective en-
forcement" of certain of the rights listed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. IS 
10. judgment, supra note 3, at 1-2. 
11. /d. at 2. 
12. U.N. CHARTER Preamble & art. 1, para. 3. See F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as JACOBS). 
13. Declaration, supra note 2, arts. 1-27. 
14. See JACOBS, supra note 12, at 3. 
15. Convention, supra note 4, Preamble. For the historical development of the Convention and 
the procedures and decisions of the Commission and Court, see JACOBs, supra note 12; Z. NED-
JATI, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION (European Studies in Law, No.8, 
1978) [hereinafter cited as NEDJATI); F. CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS (1974) [hereinafter cited as CASTBERG); R. BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE: A 
STUDY OF THE MACHINERY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as BEDDARD); G. WElL, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 
BACKGROUND, DEVELOPMENT AND.PROSPECTS (1963); j. FAWCETT, THE ApPLICATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1969). In addition, a valuable source of informa-
tion on the Convention is the BIBLIOGRAPHY RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS (1978), published by the Directorate of Human Rights of the Council of Europe 
in February 1978. This bibliography, printed in both English and French, contains a 154-page 
listing of books and articles on human rights in general and their protection under the European 
system. It is available from the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France. 
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The Convention was drafted by member states of the Council of Europel6 
and was opened for signature and ratification on November 4, 1950. The 
Convention entered into force in September of 1953, after the deposit of ten 
instruments of ratification with the Secretary General of the Council of 
EuropeY 
The guaranteed rights and freedoms are set out in Section I of the Conven-
tion. The main focus of the Convention is the protection of certain civil and 
political rights, including: the right to life,18 freedom from torture and from 
inhuman or degrading treatment,19 freedom from slavery, servitude and 
forced, compulsory labor,20 the right to liberty and security of person,21 the 
right to a fair and public trial,22 the right to privacy and family life,23 freedom 
of conscience and religion,2f freedoms of expression25 and peaceful 
assembly,26 the right to marry, 27 the right to an effective remedy for breach of 
the above rights and freedoms28 and the right to enjoy such rights and 
freedoms without discrimination on any grounds. 29 Additionally, the First 
Protocol to the Convention protects property rights and the rights to education 
and free elections. 30 The Fourth Protocol guarantees freedom of movement. 31 
Article 1 of the Convention obligates the ratifying states to secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I. 32 
16. The Council of Europe is an international organization founded on May 5, 1949. Its stated 
aim is to "achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and 
reali[z)ing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their 
economic and social progress." STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE art. I(a). The organs of 
the Council of Europe now include, inter alia, the Committee of Ministers, the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights. 
The member states of the Council of Europe total twenty-one: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Den-
mark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom. (1978) Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 27. 
17. As of December 31, 1978, nineteen mem ber states of the Council of Europe had ratified 
the Convention and various of its five Protocols: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, 
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. (1978) Y.B. 
EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 27. 
18. Convention, supra note 4, art. 2. 
19. [d. art. 3. For the text of Article 3, s •• S IV.B.l irifra. 
20. Convention, supra note 4, art. 4. 
21. [d. art. 5. For the text of Article 5, see notes 326-328 irifra and accompanying text. 
22. Convention, supra note 4, art. 6. For the relevant text of Article 6, see S IV.C irifra. 
23. Convention, supra note 4, art. 8. 
U. [d. art. 9. 
25. [d. art. 10. 
26. /d. art. 11. 
27. [d. art. 12. 
28. [d. art. 13. 
29. /d. art. 14. The text of Article 14 may be read in S IV.D.l infra· 
30. Convention, supra note 4, First Protocol, enter.d into fore. May 18, 1954. 
31. [d. Fourth Protocol, entered into fore. May 2, 1968. 
32. [d. art. 1. For the text of Article 1, s •• S IV.F infra. 
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The Convention envisions a collective guarantee based upon a collective in-
terest in its enforcement. 33 The right to bring an application alleging a viola-
tion of the Convention does not depend upon the doctrine of reciprocity.34 
Therefore, each state party to the Convention may present an application to 
the Commission, whether or not that state itself or any of its nationals are the 
victims of the alleged violation. 35 
The various states party to the Convention have differed over the means by 
which the rights and freedoms guaranteed are to be protected within their in-
ternal legal systems. Some countries, including Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands, accept the theory that treaty provisions automatically become an 
integral part of domestic law upon treaty ratification. 56 Other countries, in-
cluding the United Kingdom, adopt the classical rule that treaty provisions 
must be incorporated into domestic law through an express statutory enact-
ment. 57 
The obligation under the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms 
therein to all persons within a state's jurisdiction arises immediately upon 
ratification. 58 In addition, the Convention requires its member states to ex-
plain the manner in which their internal law ensures the effective implemen-
tation of the provisions of the Convention at the request of th~ Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe. 59 
B. The Procedure Under the Convention 
1. The Role of the Commission 
The most unique aspect of the Convention is the procedure it establishes for 
the protection of collectively guaranteed rights and freedoms. The Commis-
sion and the Court are the two institutions created" [t]o ensure the observance 
of the engagements undertaken" by the states party to the Convention. 40 Ar-
ticles 20 through 23 of Section III and Articles 38 through 43 of Section IV 
describe the organization and membership of the Commission and Court, 
respectively. 41 
33. Convention, supra note 4, Preamble. 
34. JACOBS, supra note 12, at 6. 
35. See Convention, supra note 4, arts. 1 and 24. See NEDJATI, supra note 15, at 3. 
36. CASTBERG, supra note 15, at 14. See generally NEDJATI, supra note 15, at 4-5; JACOBS, supra 
note 12, at 9-10; Dale, Human Rights in the United Kingdom - International StandJJrds, 25 INT'L & 
COMPo L.Q. 292, 294 (1976). 
37. CASTBERG, supra note 15, at 14. 
38. Convention, supra note 4, art. 1. 
39. [d. art. 57. 
40. Id. art. 19. 
41. The Commission consists of a number of members equal to the number of states which 
have ratified the Convention and no two members of the Commission may be nationals of the 
same state. [d. art. 20. Article 21 provides that the Commission's members are to be elected by 
the Committee of Ministers by an absolute majority of votes. Each group of the representatives of 
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There are two procedures by which alleged violations of the Convention 
may be referred to the Commission. First, a state may present an interstate 
application, under Article 24, alleging a breach by another state.·2 Second, the 
Commission may receive applications under Article 25 from any person, non-
governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of 
a violation of the Convention by one of the member states, provided that such 
state has recognized the competence of the Commission to receive individual 
applications.·5 This right of individual application has been heralded as the 
original and innovative feature of the Convention. H 
Once an application has been referred to the Commission under Articles 24 
or 25, the Commission must make a preliminary jurisdictional decision re-
garding its admissibility.·5 In so doing, the Commission will usually obtain the 
written observations of the respondent government in response to the appli-
cant's allegations.·6 
An application shall be declared inadmissible for anyone of various reasons 
ratifying states in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe is to nominate three can-
didates, two of whom must be its nationals. /d. art. 21. Members of the Commission are usually 
elected for a six year term. /d. art. 22, as arnnulld by Fifth Protocol, mllred intoforee December 20, 
1971. They sit on the Commission i,p their individual capacity. 1d. art. 23. 
The Court consists of a number of judges equal to the number of member states of the Council 
of Europe and no two judges may be nationals of the same state. /d. art. 38. The members are 
also elected by the Consultative Assembly by a majority vote. Each member state of the Council 
of Europe nominates three candidates, two of whom must be its nationals. /d. art. 39(1). The 
qualifications required for membership on the Court include a high moral character and those at-
tributes necessary for appointment to high judicial office. 1d. art. 39(3). The members of the 
Court usually hold office for a term of nine years. 1d. art. 40(1). For consideratoin of cases 
brought before it, the Court is to consist of a Chamber of seven judges and the judge who is a na-
tional of any state party concerned is to sit ex officio. /d. art. 43. 
The members of the Court receive a compensation for each day of duty while Commission 
members do not. /d. art. 42. Both the Commission and the Court are to draw up their own rules 
of procedure. /d. arts. 36, 55. 
42. /d. art. 24. For a statement of Article 24, see note 223 infra. 
43. Convention, supra note 4, art. 25. This Comment concerns an interstate application. 
Therefore, a discussion of the individual application under Article 25 is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. However, it is interesting to consider that the provisions for interstate and individual 
applications are largely similar. One important distinction is that an applicant state can allege 
that a law itself is incompatible with the Convention while an individual applicant must also 
allege and prove that he is a victim of such a law. /d. arts. 24, 25. 
As of December 31, 1978, fourteen of the nineteen ratifying states of the Convention had made 
declarations recognizing the competence of the Commission to receive individual applications 
under Article 25: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. (1978) Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 28. For a more in-depth discussion of the 
right of individual application, stt NEDJATI, supra note 15, at 13-15; CASTBERG, supra note 15, at 
34-40. 
44. See JACOBS, supra note 12, at 6; Boyle & Hannum, supra note 9, at 244. 
45. See Convention, supra note 4, arts. 26, 27. For a discussion of the rules of admissibility 
under the Convention, stt Danelius, Conditions for Admissibility in the Jurisprudence of the European 
Commission of Human Rights, 2 HUMAN RIGHTSj. 284 (1969). 
46. JACOBS, supra note 12, at 8. 
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including failure to exhaust all domestic remedies,47 submission of an anony-
mous application48 or submission of an application which is substantially the 
same as a matter already examined by the Commission or by some other inter-
national body. 49 Other bases for refusal, where an Article 25 application is 
concerned, are incompatibility with the Convention's provisions, the presen-
tation of a complaint which is manifestly ill-founded or an abuse of the right of 
petition. 50 The vast majority of applications, especially individual applica-
tions, have been rejected as inadmissible. 51 
If an application survives the Commission's scrutiny with regard to admis-
sibility, the Commission then assumes its main function. 52 The Commission 
must conduct, together with the representatives of the concerned parties, an 
examination of the application. 53 A factual investigation is conducted where 
necessary. 54 In addition, the Commission must attempt to facilitate a "friend-
ly settlement" of the problem in question. 55 If a friendly settlement between 
the applicant and respondent. is attained, the Commission must draw up a 
report detailing the resolution of the case. 56 Copies of this report are then sent 
to the concerned parties, to the Committee of Ministers and to the Secretary 
General of the Council of EuropeY 
47. Convention, s!'pra note 4, art. 26. 
The rule requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condition of the presenta-
tion of the international claim is founded upon the principle that the respondent State 
must first have an opportunity to correct, by its own means and within the framework 
of its own domestic legal system, the wrong allegedly suffered by the individual. ... 
In order to comply with the requirements of Article 26 of the Convention, an applicant 
is obliged to exhaust every domestic remedy which cannot clearly be said to lack any 
prospect of success. In order to exhaust all domestic remedies the applicant should avail 
himself of all judicial remedies open to him, including appeal to a higher domestic 
court. 
NEDJATI, supra note 15, at 15-16. For a more comprehensive coverage of the domestic remedies 
rule, see CASTBERG, supra note 15, at 40-48; McGovern, Tlu Local Remedies Rule and Administrative 
Practices in tlu European Convention on Human Rights, 24 INT'L& COMPo L.Q. 119 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as McGovern); Trindade, Tlu Burden of Proof with Regard to Exhaustion of Local Remedies in In-
lem4lional Law 9 R.D.H. 81 (No.1, 1976). 
For a discussion of the domestic remedies rule as it relates to the case of Ireland V. the United 
Kingdom, see CASTBERG, supra note 15, at 47-48; NEDJATI, supra note 15, at 70-71. 
48. Convention, supra note 4, art. 27(1)(a). 
49. /d. art. 27(IXb). 
50. Id. art. 27(2). 
51. Between 1955 and December 31, 1978, 8,448 individual applications under Article 25 
were registered with the Commission; over 7,880 were either rejected llS inadmissible or were 
struck off the list. (1978) Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 594. 
52. The Commission cannot examine a situation ex officio; it can act only if an application is 
presented to it under Article 24 or Article 25. Convention, supra note 4, arts. 24, 25. 
53. Convention, supra note 4, art. 28(a). 
54. /d. For the text of Article 28(a), see note 227 irifra. 
55. Convention, supra note 4, art. 28(b). For the text of Article 28(b), see note 233 infra. 
56. Convention, supra note 4, art. 30, as amended by Third Protocol, enUred intoforee September 
21, 1970. 
57. /d. 
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In the event that a solution is not reached, the Commission will compile a 
report of the facts and state whether, in its opinion, such facts disclose a breach 
by the respondent government of its obligations under the Convention.'8 The 
report may also include such proposals as the Commission considers appro-
priate." Thereafter, the report is sent to the Committee of Ministers and to 
the parties involved, but it is not made public.60 
2. The Role of the Court 
At this stage of the process, either one oftwo courses may be pursued. One 
alternative is to refer the case to the Court, which then serves an appellate 
function. 61 If the states concerned are subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court62 or if the subject states have given their consent, the case may be 
referred to the Court for judicial resolution of the dispute.63 The Court can 
hear a case only after the Commission has acknowledged the failure of efforts 
to achieve a friendly settlement. 64 The Court must consider a case within three 
months of the date ofthe transmission ofthe Commission's report to the Com-
mittee of Ministers.6' Finally, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over a case 
only if it is referred by one of the states party to the Convention or by the 
Commission.66 
If a case is properly brought before it, the Court will render a decision. This 
decision is final67 and binding upon the concerned parties. 68 The judges of the 
Court are entitled to submit separate opinions if unanimity is unobtainable. 69 
The Court must also provide the reasoning behind its decision. 70 The judg-
58. /d. art. 31(1). For the text of Article 31(1), see note 234 infra. 
59. Convention, supra note 4, art. 31(3). 
60. /d. art. 31(2). 
61. Convention, supra note 4, art. 48. A case may be referred to the Court by the Commission, 
a state party whose national is alleged to be a victim, the state party which originally referred the 
case to the Commission or a state party against which the complaint was originally lodged. /d. 
Therefore, an individual applicant may not refer a case to the Court. Between 1959 and January 
1980, the Court has had thirty-one cases referred to it. European Court of Human Rights; The 
European Court of Human Rights: lIs Organization and Working 2 (Press Release B(80)5, 1980) 
[hereinafter cited as Press Release]. As of January 23, 1980, Ireland v. the United Kingdom is the 
only interstate case which the Court has had the opportunity to examine. /d. at 4. 
62. Convention, supra note 4, art. 46. As of January 23,1980, eighteen of the nineteen ratify-
ing states of the Convention had made declarations under Article 46 recognizing the compulsory 
jurisdiction ofthe Court: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Federal Republic ofGer-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Press Release, supra note 61, at 1. 
63. See note 61 supra. 
64. Convention, supra note 4, art. 47. 
65. /d. arts. 32(1), 47. 
66. /d. art. 44. See art. 48. 
67. Id. art. 52. 
68. /d. art. 53. 
69. ld. art. 51(2). 
70. Id. art. 51(1). 
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ment is then transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which supervises its 
execution.71 Article 50 of the Convention provides that the Court may, if 
necessary, afford just satisfaction to an injured party where the internal law of 
a concerned state party to the Convention allows only partial reparation for 
the consequence of the Court's decision. 72 
If the case is not referred to the Court within the three month period, the 
Committee of Ministers will decide by a two-thirds majority vote whether the 
Convention has been violated. 7S This decision, like that of the Court, is bind-
ing upon the interested parties.7+ The Committee of Ministers may also pre-
scribe a period within which the respondent government must undertake the 
measures required by its decision. 75 
C. An Exception to the Jurisdiction of the Commission and Court 
1. Discretionary Derogation Under Article 15 
The Convention establishes the minimum standards necessary to preserve 
the rule oflaw and due process from arbitrary abuse by the executive of a state 
party to the Convention.76 However, even these minimum standards have 
limitations upon their application. One important exception to the jurisdiction 
of the Commission and Court - an exception which had a major impact upon 
the decision in Ireland v. the United Kingdom - is Article 15. 77 This provision 
permits derogation from obligations under the Convention in certain situa-
tions. Article 15(1) states that: 
[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures dero-
gating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law. 78 
It is apparent that Article 15 leaves a state with a great deal of discretion in 
determining whether there exists a "public emergency threatening the life of 
71. .!d. art. 54. 
72.' Id. art. 50. For the text of Article 50, see note 258 infra. 
73. Convention, supra note 4, art. 32(1). 
74. !d. art. 32(4). 
75. !d. art. 32(2). 
76. Lowry, Terrorism, supra note 1, at 86; CASTBERG, supra note 15, at 7. 
77. For a discussion of Article 15 as it was applied by the Commission and the Court in the 
case of Ireland v. the United Kingdom, see Green, Derogation of Human Rights in Emergency Situations, 16 
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 92, 98-101 (1978). . 
78. Convention, supra note 4, art. 15(1). A more comprehensive examination of the Article 15 
right of derogation may be found in NEDJATI, supra note 15, at 33-36; JACOBS, supra note 12, at 
204-09; CASTBERG, supra note 15, at 165-70; BEDDARD, supra note 15, at 43-46; Higgins, Deroga-
tions Untkr Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 281, 288-315 (1976-1977) [hereinafter 
cited as Higgins). 
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the nation" and whether the derogating measures taken are only "to the ex-
tent strictly reQuired bv the exigencies of the situation. "79 However, the Com-
mission and the Court serve an oversight function through their power and 
duty to review a state's exercise of its discretion in invoking Article 15.80 This 
includes a factual determination. of whether a "public emergency" actually 
did exist at the time of derogation. 81 A review of the derogating measures 
taken and of their administration by the state must also be conducted to ascer-
tain whether such measures were "strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation. "82 
2. Limitations Upon the Right of Derogation 
An important limitation on the Article 15 discretion of a state party to the 
Convention is that no derogation whatsoever is permitted from the proscrip-
79. Convention, supra note 4, art. 15. The discretion accorded a derogating state follows from 
the well·known doctrine of necessity under both constitutional and international law . CASTBERG, 
supra note 15, at 165. 
80. In its decision in the "Lawless" Case, (1961) Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438, 
the Court firmly established the competence of the Commission and of itself to examine and pass 
judgment upon the legitimacy of a government's recourse to emergency powers under threat of a 
public emergency and also of any exceptional measures taken due to the exigencies of the situa· 
tion. /d. at 472, 474. See NEDJATI, supra note 15, at 34. 
It is apparent that the drafters of the, Convention desired to prevent arbitrary derogations from 
obligations based upon the plea of necessity and, therefore, attempted to prescribe the conditions 
and procedure to be followed when emergency powers are to be implemented under Article 15. 
CASTBt:RG, supra note 15, at 165·66. 
The prior case law of the Commission and of the Court has helped to clarify and to establish 
the limitations and application of Article 15. Set "Cyprus" Cases, (1958-1959) Y.B. EUR. CONY. 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 182; "Lawless" Case, (1961) Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438; 
"Greek" Case, (1969) Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 71, 72 (Published 1972). For a 
discussion of the impact of these judgments upon the interpretation of Article 15, see BEDDARD, 
supra note 15, at H-46;JACOBS, supra note 12, at 204-09. 
Note that issues under Article 15 are examined on the merits and, consequently, cannot be 
disposed of at the admissibility stage of the proceedings. /d. at 208. 
81. See the "Lawless" Case, (1961) Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS at 472-74. In this 
case, the Court defined a public emergency as "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency 
which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organi[z)ed life of the communi-
ty of which the State is composed." /d. 
82. Convention, supra note 4, art. 15(1). In reviewing such derogating measures, the Commis-
sion and the Court have developed a standard of executive abuse known as the "margin of ap-
preciation" test. This test was first applied in the "Lawless" Case. The doctrine of the "margin 
of appreciation" is explained in A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (2d ed. 1977), quoted 
i" Lowry, Terrorism, supra note 1, at 86 n.244: 
/d. 
The concept behind this doctrine is that Article 15 has to be read in the context of the 
rather special subject matter with which it deals: the responsibilities of a Government 
for maintaining law and order in times of war or public emergency threatening the life 
of the nation. The concept of the margin of appreciation is that a Government's dis-
charge of these responsibilities is essentially a delicate problem of appreciating complex 
factors and of balancing conflicting considerations of the public interest; and that, once 
the Commission or the Court is satisfied that the Government's appreciation is at least 
on the margin of the powers conferred by Article 15, then the interest which the public 
itself has in effective Government and in the maintenance of order justifies and requires 
a decision in favor of the legality of the Government's appreciation. 
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tion against torture contained in Article 3 of the Convention. 83 This limitation 
follows from the principle that there is never a justification for the use of tor-
ture or inhuman and degrading treatment. 84 This exception to Article 15 was 
a significant factor in Ireland v. the United Kingdom. 85 
In addition, any state availing itself of the right of derogation under the 
Convention must fully inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe 
of the measures implemented and the reasons therefor. 86 When such measures 
have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are once again 
fully executed, the Secretary General must be notified. 87 
III. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF IRELAND V. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
A. The Reintroduction oj Detention and Internment 
1. The Internment Sweep of August 9, 1971 
In August of 1971, after consultation with the British Government, the Ex-
ecutive of the Northern Irish Government reintroduced internment88 in an at-
tempt to counter the mounting insurgencyB9 of a particularly violent and pro-
tracted terrorist campaign led by the Irish Republican Army (IRA).90 The 
83. Convention, supra note 4, art. 15(2). Article 15(2) reads: "No derogation from Article 2, 
except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3,4 (paragraph I) 
and 7 shall be made under this provision." /d. 
84. See Geneva Convention Relative (0 the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
(1955)3 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, art. 13; R. FAI.K, THE INYERNATIONAI. 
LAW at" CIVIL WAR 199-201 (1971); Higgins, supra note 78, at 282. 
85. See S IV.B infra. 
86. Convention, supra note 4, art. 15(3). Paragraph 3 of Article 15 raises a legal obligation. 
Failure to provide the Secretary General with the requested information amounts to a violation of 
the Convention. CASTBERG, supra note 15, at 167. In Ireland v. the United Kingdom, the United 
Kingdom Government fulfilled its obligation under Article 15(3) by filing letters of derogation on 
August 20, 1971, January 23, 1973 and August 16, 1973. Judgment, supra note 3, at 73. Such 
notices of derogation concerned the use of certain emergency powers conferred by several dif-
ferent pieces of legislation. See § III infra. 
87. Convention, supra note 4, art. 15(3). 
88. The use of emergency powers (including arrest without warrant, detention and intern· 
ment) by the civil authorities has eXisted throughout the history of Northern Ireland. In fact, 
resort to emergency powers has been taken in each decade of the existence of Northern Ireland. 
Lowry, Internment: Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 261, 273 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as Lowry, Internment). For a short, though slightly biased, account of the use of 
internment in Northern Ireland, see. id. at 268-75. 
89. An excellent examination of modern theories of insurgency and counter-insurgency is 
found in F. KITSON, Low INTENSITY OPERATIONS: SUBVt:RSION, INSURGENCY, Pt:ACEKEt:PING 
(1971). See]. MCCUEN, THE ART OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1966). For a discussion 
of theories of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism as they relate to the conflict in Northern 
Ireland, see Lowry, Terrorism, supra note 1. 
90. For an analysis of the beginnings of the current IRA campaign, see O'BRIEN, supra note I; 
LSTIT, supra note 1. The Commission describes the IRA as follows: 
The Irish Republican Army ... was formed during World War I. It is a clandestine 
organi[z)ation with quasi·military dispositions, which accepts neither the structure of 
Government in the Republic of Ireland nor the existence of Northern Ireland as part of 
the United Kingdom and which seeks to change both by force. 
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decision to reintroduce detention and internment was made in the early sum-
mer of 1971 in response to the deteriorating situation in Northern Ireland. 91 It 
should be noted that the use of violence to achieve political ends has been a 
recurring phenomenon throughout the short history of Northern Ireland. 92 
Violence conducted by both Catholic and Protestant extremists reemerged in 
the wake of the civil rights demonstrations of the late 1960' s. 93 
Due to the increasing levels of violence, civil disturbance and terrorism, the 
British Army was called into Northern Ireland in August 1969, to assist the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in its attempt to control the civil strife 
which had reached emergency proportions.9• Riots, shootings and bombings 
continued throughout 1970 and into 1971. Indeed, the IRA began an offen-
sive campaign which continues to the present. 
Exercising powers vested in the Horne Affairs Minister by the Civil 
Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922 (Spedal Powers 
Act),95 a general internment sweep was conducted in the early hours of August 
Report, supra note 9, at 15. It should be noted that in 1969, the IRA split into two factions: the 
"Official" IRA and the "Provisional" IRA. /d. 
91. LSTIT, supra note I, at 260-70. 
92. &eO'BRIEN, supra note 1; Dt: PAOR, supra note 1. 
93. &e note 1 supra. In addition, for accounts of the disturbances of the late 1960's, as viewed 
by committees of inquiry appointed by the Government of Northern Ireland, see DISTURBANCES 
IN NORTHt:RN IRt:I.AND: Rt:PORT Ot· THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE GoVERNOR OF NOR· 
THERN IRt:I.AND, CMD. No. 532 (N.I. 1969) (Cameron); VIOLENCE AND CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN 
NORTHt:RN IRt:I.AND IN 1969, CMD. No. 566 (N.I. 1972) (Scarman). 
94. &e Judgment, supra note 3, at 9. 
95. 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 5 (N.I. 1922), as amended by 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 5 (N.I. 1928); 23 & 24 
Geo. 5, Co 12 (N.I. 1933); 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 2 (N.I. 1943) [Special Powers Act). The Special 
Powers Act was originally enacted as a temporary measure and thus had to be renewed annually. 
In 1933, the Special Powers Act was made permanent by statute. Civil Authorities (Special 
Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1933,23 & 24 Geo. 5, Co 12, S 2(1). 
The Preamble of the Special Powers Act stated that it was "[aJn Act to empower certain 
authorities of the Government of Northern Ireland to take steps for preserving the peace and 
maintaining order in Northern Ireland .... " Special Powers Act, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 5, Pream-
ble. The Special Powers Act was an enabling statute. Its substantive provisions were contained in 
regulations made under the Act pursuant to the powers vested in the Home Affairs Minister. He 
was authorized to delegate such powers to a police officer and was also authorized to vary or 
revoke the regulations. /d. H 1(2) & (3). The following regulations were promulgated in 1956 and 
are those with which the case of Ireland v. the United Kingdom is concerned. Regulation 10 provides: 
Any officer of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, for the preservation of the peace and 
maintenance of order, may authori[z)e the arrest without warrant and detention for a 
period of not more than 48 hours of any person for the purpose of interrogation. 
Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act Regulations (Northern Ireland), 1922, Reg. 10 (No. 191, 
1956). Regulation 11(1) provides: 
Any person authori[z)ed for the purpose by the Civil Authority, or any police constable, 
or member of any of Her Majesty's Forces on duty when the occasion for the arrest 
arises may arrest without warrant any person whom he suspects of acting or having 
acted or of being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or 
maintenance of order. . . . 
/d. Reg. 11(1). Regulation 11(2) provides: 
Any person so arrested may on the order of the Civil Authority be detained in any of 
Her Majesty's prisons or elsewhere as may be specified in the order .... 
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9, 1971.96 On that day, over 340 persons97 were arrested as suspected IRA ter-
rorists under Regulation 1298 of the Special Powers Act. The arrested persons 
were taken to one of three Regional Holding Centres99 where they were inter-
rogated and subsequently released or detained for further interrogation and/or 
internment. Within the following six months, over 2,350 persons were ar-
rested under the regulations of the Special Powers Act, of whom 1,600 were 
released after interrogation. loo 
2. Objections to the Reintroduction of Detention and Internment 
This reintroduction of internment sparked a violent reaction among the 
Jd. Reg. 11(2). Regulation 12(1) provides: 
When it appears to the Minister of Home Affairs for Northern Ireland on the recom-
mendation of an officer of the Royal Ulster Constabulary ... that for securing the 
preservation of the peace and the maintenance of order in Northern Ireland it is ex-
pedient that a person .... shall be subjected to such obligations and restrictions as are 
hereinafter mentioned, the Minister of Home Affairs may by order require that person 
forthwith or from time to time either to remain in or to proceed to or reside in such place 
as may be specified in the order ... or to be interned as may be directed by the order. 
/d. Reg. 12(1). 
The powers created in the civil authority by the Special Powers Act and its regulations have 
continually been referred to as draconian in nature. See, e.g., LSTIT, supra note 88, at 33-34; 
Lowry, Intnnment, supra note 88, at 271. Under Section 1 of the Special Powers Act, the civil 
authority had the power "to take all such steps and issue all such orders as may be necessary for 
preserving the peace and maintaining order" in Northern Ireland. Special Powers Act, 12 & 13 
Geo. 5, c. 5, S 1(1) (N.I.). 
The broad power created under Regulation 10 rendered every citizen in Northern Ireland 
liable to peremptory arrest or detention for up· to 48 hours, on the mere authority of any R UC of~ 
ficer, for the pUrp9ses of interrogation. Regulation 10 contained no requirement that the arrested 
person be in any way a suspect. 
The Special Powers Act was repealed by the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order, 
1972 [Detention of Terrorists Order], STAT. R. & O. N.I. No. 1632, at 15. The Detention ofTer-
rorists Order was in turn revoked by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973 
[Emergency Provisions Act], c. 53. 
96. This large arrest operation was known as "Operation Demetrius." Report, supra note 9, 
at 1. The list of persons (0 be arrested was compiled by the RUC in consultation with the British 
Army./d. . 
97. /d.; Lowry, Intnnment, supra note 88, at 274. 
98. Set note 95 supra. 
99. The three Regional Holding Centres set up to receive prisoners during the 48 hours of in-
terrogation were: Magilligan Weekend Training Centre in· County Londonderry, Ballykinler 
Weekend Training Centre in County Down and Girdwood Park Territorial Army Centre in 
Belfast. Report, supra note 9, at 1. Those persons who were detained for longer periods were then 
sent on board the ship "Maidstone" in Belfast Harbor or to Crumlin Road Prison. /d. In addi-
tion, 12 men were singled out and taken to an unknown center for interrogation purposes. The 
above Regional Holding Centres were closed shortly after Operation Demetrius was completed 
in August 1971. /d. at 2. They were replaced with holding centers at Palace Barracks in 
Holywood, Girdwood Park in Belfast, Gough in County Armagh and Ballykelly in County Lon-
donderry. /d. at 2. The allegations of ill-treatment investigated by the Court in Ireland v. the United 
Kingdom dealt with persons detained at the unknown holding centers, Palace Barracks, Girdwood 
Park Territorial Army Centre, Ballykinler and other miscellaneous places. Judgment, supra note 
3, at 36. 
100. Lowry, Internment, supra note 88, at 274. 
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members of the minority population in Northern Ireland. 101 Th~se emergency 
powers were originally used solely against members of the minority population 
who were suspected of being IRA terrorists or sympathizers. l02 This was so 
even though substantial numbers of the majority population were also in-
volved in extremist, terrorist-type organizations. 103 Consequently, the minori-
ty population viewed the use of detention and internment as a discriminatory 
means of repression employed by the majority-controlled government. 10+ 
Reports of brutality and of ill-treatment began to filter out of the Regional 
Holding Centres within a few days of the initial internment sweep. lOS The 
press printed statements by detainees who alleged that they had been subjected 
to ill-treatment, degrading conditions and brutality upon their initial arrest 
and/or during the 48 hours oftheir detention. IOfi Some of these allegations con-
cerned physical beatings and the use of five sensory deprivation techniques 
which were employed by the security forces during "interrogation in 
depth." 107 
The five techniques consisted of hooding, 108 subjection to "white noise,"106 
sleep deprivation, continuous wall-standingllO and deprivation of food and 
water. The United Kingdom admitted from the beginning of internment in 
August 1971, that the use of these disorientation techniques had been 
101. Judgment, supra note 3, at 14. 
102. /d. at 15. Loyalist terrorists, members of the majority population, were not subjected to 
arrest and detention under the emergency powers until February of 1973. /d. at 21; see Report, 
supra note 9, at 219. It has been accepted and admitted by the United Kingdom that some persons 
were arrested and detained during the initial internment sweep of August 1971 on the basis of in-
accurate and inadequate information. Judgment, supra note 3, at 13. 
103. Report, supra note 9, at 208-11. The Commission found that the emergency situation of 
August of 1971 "had its origins as much in the resistance of Loyalist extremists to demands by 
the Catholic community for reform as in any Republican activity." /d. at 208. However, the 
Commission noted that the reasons given for not interning any Loyalists during Operation 
Demetrius were that Loyalist activity was of minute proportions compared with that of the IRA 
and that there was insufficient intelligence available to justify the internment of any Loyalists. Id. 
at 211. 
104. See Spjut, Executive Detention in Northern Ireland: The Gardiner Report and the Northern luland 
(Emergency Provisions) (Amendment) Act of 1975, 10 IRISH JUR. 272, 275 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 
Spjut). See also Twining, Emergency Powers and Criminal Process: The Diploe" Report, 1973 CRIM. L. 
REV. 406, 414 [hereinafter cited as Twining). Professor Twining contends that (1) internment, as 
reintroduced in 1971, was discriminatory; (2) while preventative in conception, internment was 
punitive in execution; (3) the scale of the operation went beyond the exigencies strictly required 
by the situation; and (4) there was no satisfactory official pudet for grievances. Id. at 414·15. 
105. Judgment, supra note 3, at 37. 
106. /d. at 35. 
107. Id. at 36. 
108. Hooding consisted of "putting a black or navy [colored) bag over the detainees' heads 
and, at least initially, keeping it there all the time except during interrogation." /d. 
109. This involved holding the detainees, "pending their interrogations, ... in a room where 
there was a continuous loud and hissing noise." /d. 
110. The detainees were forced to remain for long periods oftime in a spreadeagled position, 
with their fingers placed high above their heads against a wall and their legs spread apart with the 
feet back, thereby causing them to stand on their toes with the weight of their body mainly on 
their fingers. Id. 
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authorized at a "high level" of government. 11 I In fact, the methods had been 
taught . to members of the R UC by the English Intelligence Centre at a 
seminar held in April 1971. 112 
The utilization of the five techniques was of considerable benefit to the 
Government of NortherI1 Ireland as it resulted in the disclosure of a substan-
tial amount of intelligence information. 1I3 The interrogations revealed the 
identification of some 700 members of the IRA, details concerning the 
organization of the IRA and the discovery of individual responsibility for ap-
proximately 85 previously unexplained crimes. l14 The question of whether the 
employment of such interrogation methods was justified in light of the infor-
mation obtained and of the emergency situation then prevailing in Northern 
Ireland was of paramount importance in Ireland v. the United Kingdom. The 
Irish Government presented its petition to the Commission in December 
1971, alleging, inter alia, that the means employed to obtain intelligence infor-
mation were not justifiable in light of the ensuing denial and abuse of those 
human rights which are specifically protected under the Convention. 115 
B. The Compton Report 
In response to the large number of allegations of ill-treatment, the United 
Kingdom established the Compton Committee on August 31, 1971 to 
investigate allegations by those arrested on 9th August under the 
Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922 of 
physical brutality while in the custody of the security forces prior 
to either their subsequent release, the preferring of a criminal 
charge or their being lodged in a place specified in a detention 
order. 116 
The Compton Committee encountered a major obstacle in conducting its in-
vestigation. All but one of the eleven persons whose complaints were con-
sidered refused to appear as witnesses before the Committee. 117 The detainees 
objected to the procedure adopted by the Compton Committee. The Commit-
tee sat in camera. 118 Legal representatives were not permitted to cross-examine 
111. ld. 
112. /d. 
113. /d. 
114. /d. 
115. See [1972] YEARBOOK, Jupra note 5, at 76. 
116. REPORT Qt' THE ENQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE SECURITY FORCES OF 
PHYSICAL BRUTALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARISING OUT Ot· EVENTS ON THE 9TH AUGUST, 
1971, CMD. No. 4-823, at iii, (Gr. Britain 1971) [hereinafter cited as Compton Report]. The 
Committee was chaired by Sir Edmund Compton. 
117. /d. at 3; see Lowry, 111- Treatment, Brutality and Torture: Some Thoughts upon the "Treatment" of 
Irish Political Prisoners, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 553, 560 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Lowry, Irish 
Political Prisoners]. 
118. The members of the Compton Committee did not think that their ability to reach conclu-
sions was impaired by the fact that hearings were conducted in camera. Compton Report, supra 
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witnesses; nor was confrontation allowed between the detainees and their 
alleged assailants. 1I9 
Due to the lack of cooperation on the part of the detainees, the nature of the 
evidence reviewed by the Compton Committee was largely hearsay. 120 The 
Committee admitted the inherent limitations of its inquiry with regard to the 
evidence. 121 Despite this limitation on its investigatory function, the Compton 
Committee, in its report adopted November 3, 1971, concluded that inter-
rogation in depth by means of the five sensory deprivation techniques con-
stituted physical ill-treatment. 122 The Committee declined to go so far as to 
determine that the use of these techniques constituted physical brutality as 
contrasted with ill-treatment. 
Where we have concluded that physical ill-treatment took place, 
we are not making a finding of brutality on the part of those who 
handled these complainants. We consider that brutality is an in-
human or savage form of cruelty, and that cruelty implies a 
disposition to inflict suffering, coupled with indifference to, or 
pleasure in, the victim's pain. We do not think that happened 
here. 123 
In addition, the Compton Committee attempted to provide some justification 
for the use of the five techniques in stating that these methods were employed 
in support of the interrogation of "a small number of persons arrested in 
Northern Ireland who were believed to possess information of a kind which it 
was operationally necessary to obtain as rapidly as possible in the interest of 
saving lives. "12+ 
C. The Parker Report 
The findings of the Compton Committee became the subject of a great deal 
of criticism when they were made public in November 1971. 125 Consequently, 
the United Kingdom appointed yet another committee, the Parker Commit-
tee, to consider "whether, and if so in what respects, the procedures currently 
authori[z]ed for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism and for 
note 116, at 6. "It has been open to both complainants and to those complained against to be 
legally represented. No complainant availed himself ofthis facility though we were assisted by the 
legal representatives of army and police witnesses." /d. 
119. Lowry, Irish Political Prisoners, supra note 117, at 560. 
120. Such evidence consisted of press reports, written statements supposedly signed by the 
complainants, personal inspection of the Holding Centres, medical reports on persons admitted 
to the Holding Centres, operational orders, arrest files and oral evidence from persons in charge 
of operations. Compton Report, supra note 116, at 4-5. 
121. /d. at 3. 
122. Id. at 21-22. 
123. /d. at 23. 
124. Id. at 13. Set Lowry, Irish Political Prisoners, supra note 117, at 562. 
125. LSTIT, supra note 1, at 295. 
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their custody while subject to interrogation require amendment." 126 The 
Parker Committee submitted a majority and a minority report on January 31, 
1972.127 
The majority report of the Parker Committee discussed the five techniques, 
including their history, their continued value, possible alternatives and their 
justification. 128 In so doing, the majority specifically refrained from determin-
ing whether the interrogations conducted in compliance with aJoint Directive~ 
on Military Interrogation,129 conflicted with the United Kingdom's obliga-
tions under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. 13o The majority reserved its judgment on this 
question because the application of the Irish Government, presented to the 
European Commission of Human Rights in December 1971, was then sub 
judice. 131 
While the majority accepted the proposition that torture, whether physical 
or mental, is not justified under any conditions, it claimed that the distinction 
between "discomfort" or "hardship" and "torture" is a matter of opinion 
regardless of the definition used. U2 The majority stated that it did not support 
the principle that ends justify means.133 However, the majority was of the 
opinion that the question of the morality of the use of the five techniques 
depended upon the intensity with which they were applied and upon the provi-
sion of effective safeguards against their excessive use. I,. The recommended 
safeguards included: "guidelines" to assist the security forces in determining 
the degree to which the techniques should be applied in any particular circum-
stance; the presence of a senior officer at the interrogation center who would 
bear personal responsibility for the operation; the establishment of a panel of 
highly skilled interrogators; the presence of a doctor with some psychiatric 
background during interrogation; and, the establishment of a procedure to 
process complaints concerning the application of the five techniques. m Sub-
ject to these safeguards, the majority of the Parker Committee concluded that 
"there is no reason to rule out these techniques on moral grounds and that it is 
126. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNSELWRS ApPOINTED TO CONSIl)ER 
AUTHORIIZIED PROCEDURES FOR THE INTERROCATION OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF TERRORISM, 
CMD. No. 4901, at v, (Gr. Britain 1972) [hereinafter cited as Parker Report). The Committee 
was chaired by Lord Parker of Waddington. 
127. /d. at v, 9. 
128.' /d. at 2-7. 
129. Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas 
(February 17, 1965), as al1ll!ruled by Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security 
Operations Overseas (February 10, 1967), excerpted in Parker Report, supra note 126, at 23-24. 
130. Parker Report, supra note 126, at I. 
131. ld. at 1-2. 
132. /d. at 2. 
133. /d. at 6. 
134. /d. at 7. 
135. /d. at 8-9. 
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possible to operate them in a manner consistent with the highest standards of 
our society." 156 
The minority report, written by Lord Gardiner, varied substantially from 
that of the majority. The minority report maintained that the five techniques 
could not be lawfully authorized under the domestic law of either Northern 
Ireland or Great Britain.157 Lord Gardiner stated that such procedures could 
not even have been authorized under the emergency powers of the Special 
Powers Act. U8 Like the majority, Lord Gardiner declined to expesss his opin-
ion concerning the legality of the five techniques under international law due 
to the pending application of the Irish Government. 139 
The minority report asserted that the interrogation procedures were not 
morally justifiable, "even in the light of any marginal advantages which might 
have been obtained. " ItO In conclusion, Lord Gardiner suggested that the con-
tinued use of the five techniques would have a detrimental effect on the inter-
national reputation of the United Kingdom and on the worldwide movement 
concerning the protection of human rights. I• 1 
The Parker Report was published on March 2, 1972. That same day, the 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom made the following declaration before 
Parliament: "[The] Government, having reviewed the whole matter with 
great care and with reference to any future operations, [has] decided that the 
techniques ... will not be used in future as an aid to interrogation."lu 
Following this statement, a directive on interrogation was issued which pro-
hibited the use of the five techniques. IH 
D. The Amnesry Inter7uUio1llJI Report 
While the Parker Committee was drawing up its report, Amnesty Inter-
nationall" was conducting its own inquiry into allegations of ill-treatment 
made by persons arrested and detained under the Special Powers Act. The 
Amnesty International Commission met in Belfast between December 16 and 
136. Id. at 7. 
137. /d. at 13-14 (minorily report). 
138. /d. at 14 (minority report). 
139. /d. at 15 (minority report). 
140. /d. at 20 (minority report). 
141. Id. at21 (minority report). Lord Gardiner stated "If ... we now depart from world stan-
dards which we have helped to create, I believe that we su [would) both gravely damage our own 
reputation and deal a severe blow to the whole world movement to improve Human Rights." /d. 
(minority report). 
142. Judgment, supra note 3, at 37. The Prime Minister stated further: "[i)f a Government did 
decide ... that additional techniques were required for interrogation, then I think that ... they 
would probably have to come to the House and ask for the powers to do it." /d. 
143. Id. at 47. This directive provided for mandatory medical examinations, the keeping of 
comprehensive records and the immediate reporting of any complaints of ill-treatment. U. 
144. See note 2 supra. 
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20, 1971, to consider 30 cases of alleged ill-treatment.14~ Its report was pub-
lished in March 1972, after the United Kingdom Prime Minister had made his 
statement concerning the termination of the use of the five techniques.· 46 
The Amnesty International Commission found that in all cases where 
medical information was available, the evidence supported the complainants' 
general allegations of ill-treatment. 147 The Amnesty International Commis-
sion concluded that "persons arrested under the Special Powers Act had been 
subjected to brutal treatment by the security forces during arrest and trans-
port." 148 Amnesty International considered these instances of brutality to be 
in violation of the United Kingdom's obligations under Article 3 of the Con-
vention.149 
The Amnesty International Commission also investigated the treatment of 
detainees during interrogation and, again, concluded that the complainants 
had been subjected to brutality. 150 In so concluding, the Amnesty Interna-
tional Commission disagreed with the Compton Committee's findings of mere 
physical ill-treatment.15I The techniques used during interrogation in depth 
were also found to be in contravention of Article 3 of the Convention.·~2 In ad-
dition, the Amnesty International Report asserted that, while the five tech-
niques'may have been discontinued in accordance with the earlier statement 
and directive of the United Kingdom, the brutality of the type confirmed in 
the report still continued.·~3 
1+5. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ot' AN ENQUIIlY INTO ALLEGATIONS ot' ILI.-TIlt:AT· 
MENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND Foreword (March 1972) [hereinafter cited as AI Rt:I'OIlT). The 
Amnesty International Commission heard oral evidence, whenever possible, from complainants 
personally. In addition, it heard medical evidence from such witnesses as were available. It dealt 
mainly with cases of individuals arrested after August 9, 1971, so as not to duplicate the work of 
the Compton Committee. /d. 
The Amnesty International Commission experienced the same obstacle in obtaining evidence 
from the authorities that the Compton Committee encountered with witnesses. Amnesty Interna-
tional received no cooperation from the authorities. Consequently, its sources of information 
were one-sided. As a result, Amnesty International was forced to draw its, conclusions based upon 
a subjective impression of the individual complainant and of his account. /d. at 3. 
146. See id. at Foreword; Judgment, supra note 3, at 37. 
147. AI REPORT, supra note 145, at 26. The Amnesty International Commission noted that 
there was a possibility that injuries may have been self-inllicted or sustained during arrest, but it 
felt that the nature of the injuries rendered both of these explanations improbable. ld. 
148. Id. 
149. /d. at 27. The Amnesty International Commission also considered these instances of 
brutality to be in violation of Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. /d. at 27. 
Article 5 of the Declaration states that "[n)o one shall be subjected to torture, or to cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment." Declaration, supra note 2, art. 5. 
150. AI REPORT, supra note 145, at 36. 
151. Id. While the Compton Committee focused on physical brutality, set S III.B supra, Amnes-
ty International concentrated on mental brutality. AI REPORT, supra note 145, at 38. 
152. /d. at 36. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was also found to have 
been violated. Id. 
153. /d. at Foreword. For more discussion on the question of continuing brutality in Northern 
Ireland, Stt § V infra. 
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E. Continued Violence and the Introduction of Direct Rule 
While the members of the Parker Committee and of the Amnesty Interna-
tional Commission were composing their respective reports, the situation in 
Northern Ireland was rapidly deteriorating. In early 1972, the level of violence 
remained higher than at any time prior to the reintroduction of internment in 
August 1971. 154 During the first three months of 1972,87 people were killed155 
and 421 bomb explosions occurred. 156 On January 30, 1972, 13 civilian 
members of the minority population died under army gunfire during the 
course of a civil rights demonstration in Loridonderry. The incident became 
known as "Bloody Sunday" and resulted in a new wave of support for the 
IRA.157 
The IRA was responsible for the majority of the violence which occurred in 
the seven month period between August 1971 and March 1972.158 However, 
violent activities were also conducted by Loyalist extremists. 159 The Loyalist 
Ulster Defense Association (UDA) was organized in September 1971, to per-
form a vigilante function. 160 The UDA eventually initiated its own campaign 
of counter-terrorism. 161 
Despite the marked upsurge in violence and terrorist activities by members 
of the majority population, all of the approximately 900 persons detained and 
interned under the Special Powers Act at the end of March 1972, were 
members of the minority population. 162 While only members of the minority 
population were subjected to the extrajudicial emergency powers at that time, 
the ordinary criminal law processes were employed against both majority and 
minority population members.16' Over 1,600 persons were charged with 
terrorism-related criminal offenses between August 9, 1971, and March 31, 
1972. 164 
In response to the worsening situation and in view of the seeming inability 
of the Northern Ireland Government to deal with the problem effectively, the 
Government of the United Kingdom announced the introduction of direct 
rule by Westminster on March 24, 1972. 165 Under an act of the United 
Kingdom, the Northern Ireland Parliament was prorogued and the British 
154. Judgment, supra note 3, at 15. 
155. ld. The total of 87 included 60 civilians and 27 members of the security forces. ld. 
156. ld. Between August 1971 and March 30, 1972, there were 1,130 bomb explosions and 
over 2,000 shooting incidents in Northern Ireland; 158 civilians, 58 soldiers and 17 policemen 
were killed; and, 2,505 civilians, 306 soldiers and 107 policemen were injured. ld. 
157. ld. For an excellent account of the events of "Bloody Sunday, ., see LSTIT, supra note I. 
158. SeeJudgment, supra note 3, at 15. 
159. See id. 
160. ld. 
161. See id. at 15-17. 
162. ld. at 15. 
163. ld. 
164. ld. 
165. ld. 
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Parliament was empowered to legislate in its stead. 166 The executive power 
was transferred to the holder of the newly created position of Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland. 167 Consequently, the Secretary of State assumed direct 
responsibility for the administration of the Special Powers Act. 168 
In an attempt to reduce the level of tension and violence in Northern Ire-
land and thereby lessen political tension, the newly appointed Secretary of 
State began to release a substantial number of internees and detainees. 169 Both 
factions of the IRA responded with the declaration of a ceasefire in the early 
summer of 1972.110 However, the truce announced by the Provisional IRA 
was rather short-lived and the summer months brought an increase in both 
Republican and Loyalist violence. 171 As a result, new detention orders were 
executed while the number of releases declined. 
F. The Diplock Report and the Detention of Terrorists Order 
By the fall of 1972, the United Kingdom Government was desperately 
searching for an alternative to internment under the Special Powers Act. 172 In 
October 1972, the United Kingdom established the Diplock Commission to 
consider "what arrangements for the administration of justice in Northern 
Ireland could be made in order to deal more effectively with terrorist organiza-
tions ... , otherwise than by internment by the Executive .... "173 
However, the United Kingdom Government did not wait for the Diplock 
Commission to present its proposals for change. On November 7, 1972, the 
Secretary of State announced the introduction of an interim measure, the 
Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order.174 The Detention of Ter-
rorists Order repealed and replaced the detention and internment regula-
tions175 of the Special Powers Act while it retained the powers of arrest con-
166. Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972 [Temporary Provisions Act). c. 22, 
Preamble. 
167. /d. 
168. See Spjut, supra note 104, at 276. 
169. Judgment, supra note 3, at 16. By mid-May of 1972,259 individuals had been released. 
/d. 
170. /d. at 17. 
171. /d. at 17·18. See also LSTIT, supra note 1. 
172. See Judgment, supra note 3, at 16. 
173. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TER· 
RORIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CMD. No. 5185, at 5 (Gr. Britain 1972) [hereinafter 
cited as Diplock Report]. The Commission was chaired by Lord Diplock. 
174. See note 95 supra. The Detention of Terrorists Order was introduced by the Secretary of 
State pursuant to his powers under the Temporary Provisions Act. See note 166 supra. For a 
general discussion ofthe Detention of Terrorists Order, see Rauch, The Compatibility of the Detention 
of Terrorists Order (Northern Ireland) with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 6 
N.Y.V. J. INT'L L. & P. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rauch]. 
175. Specifically repealed were regulations 11(2) and 12( 1). For the text of these regulations, 
see note 95 supra. 
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ferred under the Special Powers ActY6 Under the new order, "internment" 
as such was abolished and formal "detention" with some procedural safe-
guards was introduced. 177 
1. Interim Custody and Detention under the Detention 
of Terrorists Order of 1972 
Under the provisions of the Detention of Terrorists Order, when the Secre-
tary of State for Northern Ireland suspected that an individual had committed 
or was attempting to commit an act of terrorism,178 or, that such individual 
had directed the organization or training of others for the purpose of ter-
rorism, the Secretary could sign an interim custody orderY' This interim 
custody order authorized the temporary detention of the suspect for no more 
than 28 days, unless the Secretary of State referred the case to a Commissioner 
for the purpose of conducting a quasi-judicial hearing. 180 If the Commissioner 
was satisfied that the individual's detention was necessary for the protection of 
the public, he was to issue a detention order.181 If the Commissioner was not 
so satisfied, he was to order the release of the detained individual. 182 The 
legislation included a provision for appeal by the detainee to a Detention Ap-
peal Tribunal within 21 days of the issuance of the detention order.183 How-
ever, the duration of detention under the Detention of Terrorists Order was 
unlimited. l84 During the period between the entry into force of the Detention 
of Terrorists Order and January 31, 1973, 166 interim custody orders and 128 
detention orders were processed while 94 persons were released. 18s 
The Diplock Commission submitted its report to the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom in December 1972, after a hastily conducted investiga-
tion. 186 The Diplock Report referred to the five techniques which were 
176. See id. 
177. See Spjut, supra note 104, at 277. See Twining, supra note 104, at 410. 
178. "Terrorism," as defined in the Detention of Terrorists Order, is "the use of violence for 
political ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public ... in fear." 
Detention of Terrorists Order, STAT. R. & O. N.I. No. 1632, art. 2(2). 
179. /d. art. 4(1). 
180. /d. art. 4(3). A "Commissioner" had to be a person who held a judicial office in the 
United Kingdom or who was a barrister, advocate or solicitor of not less than ten years standing. 
/d. Schedule Part I. The hearing before the Commissioner was to be conducted in camera. /d. art. 
6(4). The respondent was to be represented by counsel and was allowed to be present at the hear· 
ing. /d. Schedule Part III. 
181. /d. arts. 5(1), (2). The detention order had to contain a statement of the grounds upon 
which it was issued and a copy of the detention order had to be delivered to the detainee. /d. art. 
5(3). 
182. See Rauch, supra note 174, at 3. 
183. Detention of Terrorists Order, STAT. R. & O. N.I. No. 1632, art. 6(1). 
184. See Lowry, [nlemmenl, supra note 88, at 294. 
185. Judgment, supra note 3, at 21. 
186. For a critical discussion of the Diplock Commission's manner of proceeding and of its 
recommendations, see Twining, supra note 104. Professor Twining notes that the Diplock Report 
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discussed in the earlier Compton and Parker Reports. 187 The Diplock Com-
mission flatly refused to condone such practices, concluding that their use was 
counter-productive. 188 The members of the Diplock Commission also com-
mented that the large-scale internment sweep of August 1971, had led to the 
arrest and detention of a number of persons based upon" inadequate and in-
accurate information. "189 The Diplock Commission concluded that there was 
no alternative to the use of extrajudicial detention so long as terrorists con-
tinued to operate in Northern Ireland and intimidation of potential witnesses 
to terrorist activities continued. 190 
After discussing the continuing need for detention and approving the new 
detention procedures provided under the Detention of Terrorists Order, the 
Diplock Commission made several recommendations concerning changes in 
the existing criminal legal procedure dealing with terrorists. 191 It was hoped 
that these reforms would reduce the number of cases dealt with under extra-
judicial detention procedures. Such recommendations included, inter alia, the 
admissibility of confessions as evidence unless obtained by torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment; 192 a conferral upon members of the army of the power 
to arrest without warrant and detain in custody for up to four hours;193 and, a 
transfer of the burden of proof from the prosecution to the accused as to the 
possession of firearms or explosives.1 94 
G. The Emergency Provisions Act and the Gardiner Report 
1. The Emergency Provisions Act of 1973 
Many of the recommendations of the Diplock Commission were subse-
quently incorporated in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Actl95 
is "out of touch with certain phases of public opinion in Northern Ireland." Id. at 411. Twining 
suggests several factors which may have reduced the significance of the Diplock Report in-
cluding: the "great dispatch" with which the Diplock Comission acted; the fact that almost all of 
the evidence was heard in London, far from the realities of the situation; the fact that the Diplock 
Report was necessarily one-sided as most of the evidence was obtained from government sources; 
and, the insensitivity of the Diplock Commission in suggesting that adequate safeguards and 
effective remedies existed against abuses by members of the security forces for unlawful arresl or 
for improper methods of interrogation. /d. at 41 0-12. 
187. See Diplock Report, supra note 173, at 31. See also SS III. B & C supra. 
188. Diplock Report, supra note 173, at 31. 
189. /d. at 15. The members of the Diplock Commission continued by saying that they were 
satisfied that the security authorities had "learnt the lessons of the experience." /d. at 16. 
190. /d. at 14. 
191. /d. at 17-34. 
192. /d. at 32. It should be noted that in recommending this limited exception to a general rule 
of admissibility of confessions, the Diplock Commission was expressly adopting the wording of 
Article 3 of the Convention. /d. 
193. /d. at 21. 
194. This transfer of the burden of proof required the accused to prove that he did not know, 
nor had any reason to suspect, that firearms or explosives were where they were found. [d. at 
27-28. 
195. See note 95 supra. The Emergency Provisions Act was extended by Orders of July 17, 
1974, December 17, 1974 and June 27, 1975. Judgment, supra note 3, at 24. 
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which entered into force on August 8, 1973. The Emergency Provisions Act 
was enacted as a consequence of the growing dissatisfaction of the general 
public of Northern Ireland with the operation of the quasi-judicial detention 
procedures. 196 In August of 1973, opposition to detention was no longer 
limited to members of the minority population as the United Kingdom had 
begun to exercise the detention procedures against Loyalists and other majori-
ty population members in February of that year. 197 
The Emergency Provisions Act repealed the remaining regulations of the 
Special Powers Act and also repealed the recently enacted Detention of Ter-
rorists Order .198 However, in substance, the Emergency Provisions Act re-
tained most of the interim custody and detention procedures contained in the 
Detention of Terrorists Order .199 In addition, the Act made some alterations 
in the criminal procedures employed against suspected terrorists,200 basing 
these changes on the recommendations of the Diplock Commission. 
2. The Gardiner Report 
The life of the Emergency Provisions Act was almost as short-lived as that of 
the Detention of Terrorists Order. By 1974, it was obvious that the United 
Kingdom Government was unable to effectively and quickly process the cases 
brought before it under the provisions of the new act.201 It was also apparent 
that detention was not being carried out with the degree of impartiality ex-
pected of quasi-judicial procedures.202 
Consequently, the United Kingdom appointed still another commission to 
investigate the operation of the detention procedures under the Emergency 
Provisions Act. This commission, known as the Gardiner Committee, ex-
amined what provisions and powers, "consistent to the maximum extent prac-
ticable in the circumstances with the preservation of civil liberties and human 
rights," were required to deal with terrorism and subversion in Northern 
Ireland. 203 
196. See Spjut, supra note 104, at 278. 
197. See id.; see also Judgment, supra note 3, at 21. For a brief discussion of the increasing level 
of Loyalist terrorism and accompanying Protestant militancy in late 1972 and in 1973, see id. at 
20-21. 
198. Emergency Provisions Act, 1973, c. 53, Schedule 5. 
199. Extrajudicial powers enacted under the Emergency Provisions Act included arrest 
without warrant by a policeman and detention for 72 hours, id. Part II, SS 10(1), (3); arrest 
without warrant by a member of the army and detention for 4 hours, id. Part II, S 12(1); interim 
custody for 28 days, id. Schedule I, Part II, SS 11(1), (3); and, detention, id. Schedule I, Part II, 
S 24. 
200. See id. Part I. 
201. Spjut, supra note 104, at 273. 
202. Id. See Lowry, Inllmmml, supra note 88, at 308. 
203. REPORT OF A COMMITIEE TO CONSIDER, IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS, MEASURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CMD. No. 
5847, at I, (Gr. Britain 1975) [hereinafter cited as Gardiner Report). The Gardiner Committee 
was chaired by Lord Gardiner who had written the minority opinion in the Parker Report. 
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The Gardiner Committee commenced its report by addressing the argu-
ments of those who maintained that several features of the then existing 
emergency provisions were "so inherently objectionable" that they should be 
abolished as basic violations of human rights. 204 The Gardiner Committee 
flatly disagreed with these arguments. It decided that the liberty of an in-
dividual, although a human right, is not an absolute right. 205 The Gardiner 
Committee argued that an individual should be restrained from using his 
liberty to take away that of another. 206 The members of the Gardiner Commit-
tee concluded that the United Kingdom Government had acted legitimately, 
arid consistently with the provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, in restricting certain fundamental liberties in Northern Ireland. 207 
However, the Gardiner Committee asserted that the operation of emergen-
cy powers in Northern Ireland should be limited both in scope and 
duration. 208 With particular reference to the emergency power of detention, 
the Committee stated in its report: 
After long and anxious consideration, we are of the opinion that 
detention cannot remain as a long-term policy. In the short term, 
it may be an effective means of containing violence, but the pro-
longed effects of the use of detention are ultimately inimical to 
community life, fan a widespread sense of grievance and injustice, 
and obstruct those elements in Northern Ireland society which 
could lead to reconciliation. Detention can only be tolerated in a 
democratic society in the most extreme circumstances; it must be 
used with the utmost restraint and retained only as long as it is 
strictly necessary. 209 
The Gardiner Committee conducted a critical investigation of the existing trial procedures 
before the ordinary criminal courts, existing offenses concerning terrorism, the powers of the 
security forces, prison accommodation and detention. Gardiner Report, supra, at 9-49. In reach-
ing its conclusions and recommendations, the Gardiner Committee considered 157 written 
memoranda from various individuals and groups, including Amnesty International, the Army, 
political parties in Northern Ireland, human rights organizations and the RUC. /d. at I, 59, 60. 
The Committee heard oral evidence from 97 witnesses. /d. at 1. In addition, members of the 
Gardiner Committee visited several prisons, army posts and RUC stations in Northern Ireland. 
/d. at 1-2. The Gardiner Committee met in private and did not publish the evidence which it 
received. /d. at 1. 
The appendix to the Gardiner Report contains tables indicating the statistics of violence in 
Northern Ireland from January 1,1971 through November 30,1974, id. at 61; statistics on the 
prison population from January I, 1968 through November 30, 1974, id. at 66; and, statistics on 
the number of detention orders, interim custody orders and release orders from July I, 1973 
through November 30, 1974, id. at 68-69: 
204. /d. at 6. The criticized features included the use of the Army in aid of the civil power, 
detention without trial, arrest on suspicion and trial without a jury. [d. 
205. /d. 
206. /d. 
207. /d. at 6-7,50. The Gardiner Committee noted that the United Kingdom had given prop-
er notice of derogation under Article 15 of the Convention in order to deal with terrorism in 
Northern Ireland. /d. at 7. Set note 86 supra. 
208. Gardiner Report, supra note 203, at 7. 
209. /d. at 43. 
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The Gardiner Committee accepted the criticisms of the detention pro-
cedures under the Emergency Provisions Act as being largely justified. 210 Ac-
cording to the Gardiner Report, the most persuasive criticism was that the 
detention procedures were "unsatisfactory, or even farcical, if considered as 
judicial. "211 As a result, the Committee proposed several changes in the 
detention procedures.112 In addition, the Gardiner Committee made recom-
mendations for changes in the ordinary trial procedures dealing with ter-
rorists,2JS the existing offenses relating to terrorism,21+ prison accomoda-
tions215 and the "special category" status of prisoners. 2Ui 
The Gardiner Report was presented to the United Kingdom Parliament in 
January 1975.217 On August 21, 1975, Parliament passed the Northern Ire-
land (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment) Act.2J8 This Act WaS based on the 
210. Gardiner Report, supra note 203, at 43-44. 
211. Id. at 44. The Gardiner Report continued: 
The advenarial method of trial is reduced to impotence by the needs of security .... 
[T)he overwhelming amount of heanay evidence and the in camera sessions are totally 
alien to ordinary trial procedures. The quasi-judicial procedures are a veneer to an en-
quiry which, to be effective, inevitably has no relationship to common law procedures. 
Id. 
212. Id. at 45-49. The proposed changes included repeal of certain provisions for detention 
under the Emergency Provisions Act, creation of a Detention Advisory Board to carry out the in-
vestigation ofthe cases of persons proposed for detention, new time limits for the several phases of 
the detention procedures, creation of a Release Advisory Committee and establishment of a pre-
release center and an ordered release program 10 prepare releasable detainees for entry back into 
society. Id. For a lengthier discussion and analysis of the Gardiner Committee's proposed 
changes, SN Spjut, supra note 1M, at 278-97. Sa also Lowry, Irltmtmml, supra note 88, at 308-14. 
213. Gardiner Report, supra note 203, at 9-23. 
214. Id. at 24-26. 
215. Id. at 33-37. 
216. Id. at 34-35. In June of 1972, after a hunger strike was conducted at Crumlin Road 
Prison, a special category status for convicted prisoners was introduced. 
In practice this has meant that any convicted criminal sentenced to more than nine 
months' imprisonment who claims political motivation and who is acceptable to [prison 
officials) ... is accorded special status. There were on 30th November (1974), l,tt9 
prisonen in this special category out of a total of 1,771 convicted prisonen. . . . They 
are allowed to wear their own clothes and are not required to work. They receive more 
frequent visits than other prisoners and are allowed food parcels, and can spend their 
own money in the prison canteen. They are segregated in compounds according to the 
paramilitary organi[zJation to which they claim allegiance, in the same way as de-
tainees. 
Id. at 34. The members of the Gardiner Committee reached the conclusion that the introduction 
of special category status had been a serious mistake and they recommended that the status be 
terminated at the earliest practicable opportunity. Id. at 34-35. For subsequent developments 
with regard to the status of prisonen in Northern Ireland, see S V irifra. 
217. Judgment, suprtJ note 3, at 24. 
218. 1975, c. 62. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Amendment Act 1975 (Emergen-
cy Provisions Amendment Act) was continued twice by Parliamentary Resolution. The Northern 
Ireland (Emergeney Provisions) (Amendment) Act 1977, c. 34, increased the maximum term of 
imprisonment which could be imposed for certain offenses connected with terrorism. Id. 
Preliminary Note. The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, c. 5, consolidated, 
illler alia, most of the Emergency Provisions Act of 1973 and the Emergency Provisions Amend-
ment Acts of 1975 and 1977. Id. Preliminary Note. 
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recommendations of the Gardiner Committee219 and amended the emergency 
powers and ·the law relating to terrorism, the maintenance of order and the 
detection of crime in Northern Ireland. 220 
On December 5, 1975, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland signed 
orders for the release of the last 75 individuals held under the emergency 
powers. 221 According to the evidence before the European Court of Human 
Rights, no individual was held in detention under the extrajudicial powers in 
Northern Ireland between December 1975 and the date of the Court's deci-
sion in January 1978. 222 
IV. THE DECISION OF THE COURT 
A. The Proceedings of the Case 
1. The Filing of the Application with the Commission 
The Government of Ireland filed its interstate application under Article 
24223 of the Convention with the Commission on December 16, 1971.224 The 
application alleged that the United Kingdom had, in relation to Northern Ire-
land, contravened Articles 1, 2, 3,5,6,14 and 15 of the Convention. 225 On 
October 1, 1972, the Commission declared the application ad.missible in part, 
accepting the allegations that: 
(1) the methods of interrogation of persons held in custody 
amounted to an administrative practice in violation of Article 
3; 
(2) internment without trial and detention under the emergency 
powers constituted an administrative practice in breach of Ar-
ticle 5 and 6 in connection with Article 15; 
(3) the exercise by the United Kingdom of the extrajudicial 
powers was being carried out with discrimination, thereby 
violating Article 14 in connection with Articles 5 and 6; and 
(4) the administrative practices complained of also constituted a 
breach of Article 1.226 
219. Emergency Provisions Amendment Act 1975, c. 62, Preliminary Note. 
220. ld. H 1-16. See Judgment, supra note 3, at 24. 
221. Judgment, supra note 3, at 25. 
222. /d. However, persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activities continued to be 
prosecuted under the ordinary criminal law procedures. The violence and terrorism in Northern 
Ireland has continued through the present day. For more discussion of developments since 1976, 
stt S V irifra. 
223. "Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Commission, through the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe, any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention by 
another High Contracting Party." Convention, supra note 4, art. 24. 
224. (1972) YEARBOOK, supra note 5. For a statement of the objectives of the application made 
by the Irish Government, see note 5 supra. 
225. (1972) YEARBOOK, supra note 5, at 76-78. 
226. Report, supra note 9, at 5. For an explanation of why the alleged Article 2 violation was 
declared inadmissible, Stt note 8 supra. 
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The Commission then conducted an examination of the facts and an in-
vestigation in accordance with Article 28 of the Convention. 227 It eventually 
drew up its report and transmitted it to the Committee of Ministers on 
February 9, 1976.228 
2. The Decision of the Commission and the Referral of the 
Case to the Court 
During the proceedings before the Commission in Ireland v. the United King-
dom, the written observations and oral submissions of the two concerned 
governments were received. 229 In addition, the Commission heard testimony 
from a total of 119 witnesses.230 The Commission limited the scope of its in-
vestigation to the autumn of 1971 with respect to allegations of ill-treatment 
and torture. 23J In its inquiry into the legitimacy of the emergency powers 
under the Convention and the question of their discriminatory application, 
the Commission broadened its scope to include the period from August of 
1971 to June of 1974.232 
More than four years after declaring the application of the Irish Govern-
ment partly admissible, and after failing to reach a friendly settlement233 of the 
227. Article 28(a) states that the Commission "shall, with a view to ascertaining the facts, 
undertake together with the representatives of the !1arties an examination of the [application) 
and, if need be, an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the States concerned shall fur-
nish all necessary facilities, after an exchange of views with the Commission .... " Convention, 
supra note 4, art. 28(a). 
228. Judgment, supra note 3, at 1. 
229. /d. at SO. 
230. /d. Sixteen "illustrative" cases were chosen from the 228 cases of alleged ill-treatment 
originally submitted by the Irish Government. /d. at 3S. These cases were chosen for the purpose 
of ascertaining the facts of the case, as required by the Convention. Convention, supra note 4, art. 
28(a). The illustrative cases were examined in great detail by the Commission whicb received 
medical reports and oral evidence. Judgment, supra note 3, at 3S. The Commission considered an 
additional 41 cases of alleged ill-treatment on which it received medical reports and written com-
ments. /d. 
In considering the illustrative cases, the Commission concluded that neither the case-witnesses 
nor the security force witnesses gave" accurate and complete accounts" of what had occurred. Id. 
As a result, the Commission was forced to treat the submitted medical reports as "the most im-
portant objective evidence." /d. quoting Report, supra note 9, at 407. 
The Commission designated the sixteen individuals whose cases were considered with letters 
and figures in order to protect their identity. /d. In its Report, the Commission grouped the six-
teen cases into five groups, according to the place where the alleged ill-treatment was supposedly 
inflicted: the unidentified interrogation centers, Palace Barracks, Girdwood Park Barracks, 
Ballykinler Regional Holding Centre and other miscellaneous places. Report, supra note 9, at 
403. 
231. /d. at 4S9. The Commission did accept evidence relating to later reports of ill-treatment 
and torture for its "indicative" value. /d. 
232. Id. at 11. 
233. Article 28(b) of the Convention states that the Commission "shall place itself at the 
disposal of the parties concerned with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter on the 
basis of respect for Human Rights as defined in this Convention." Convention, supra note 4, art. 
28(b). 
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case, the Commission adopted its report on January 25, 1976.23f The Com-
mission divided its lengthy report into three parts: (1) the issues relating to 
detention without trial;2S5 (2) the treatment of detainees;256 and (3) the duty to 
secure human rights. 237 In its report, the Commission expressed its opinion 
which consisted of eight points. 258 
The Irish Government, not entirely satisfied with the report of the Commis-
sion, referred its application to the Court on March 10, 1976, complying with 
the requisites of Articles 32,47 and 48.259 The Irish Government invited the 
Court to 
Id. 
234,. See Report, su/ITa note 9. Article 31(1) of the Convention reads as follows: 
If a solution is not reached, the Commission shall draw up a Report on the facts and 
state its opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a breach by the State con-
cerned of its obligations under the Convention. The opinions of all members of the 
Commission on this point may be stated in the Report. 
235. Report, su/ITa note 9,.at 9. Part One deals with the issues under Articles 5,6,14, and 15 of 
the Convention. It is further divided into the justification issue and the discrimination issue. /d. 
at 9, 105. 
236. /d. at 221. Part Two deals with the issues related to Article 3 of the Convention. /d. 
237. Id. at 4,75. Part Three is concerned with the issues raised under Article 1 of the Conven-
tion. /d. 
238. The Commission unanimously held that 
(1) the powers of detention and internment without trial, as exercised during the period 
in question, were not in conformity with Article 5, but were nevertheless justified as 
"strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" in Northern Ireland, within 
the meaning of Article 15(1); 
(2) Article 6 was not applicable to the emergency powers; 
(3) the emergency powers in question had not been applied with discrimination in con-
travention of Article 14,; 
(4,) the combined use of the five techniques in aid of interrogation in the illustrative 
cases constituted a practice of inhuman treatment and torture in breach of Article 3; 
(5) eleven other persons had suffered inhuman, and in two cases degrading, treatment 
contrary to Article 3; 
(6) there had been, in the autumn of 1971, a practice in connection with the interroga-
tion at Palace Barracks, a Regional Holding Centre, which practice amounted to 
inhuman treatment in contravention of Article 3; and 
(7) no practice in violation of Article 3 had been found to exist in connection with 
general conditions at Girdwood Park or Ballykinler Regional Holding Centres in 
August 1971. 
/d. at 4,89-91. The Commission also held by twelve votes to one, that Article I, not granting any 
rights in addition to those mentioned in Section I of the Convention, cannot be the subject of a 
separate breach. /d. at 491. An in-depth discussion ofthe Commission's opinion and reasoning is 
beyond the scope of this Comment. For a concise analysis of the Commission's decision, see 
O'Boyle & Hannum, supra note 9, at 246-58. See also O'Boyle, supra note 9. ' 
239. Read together, Articles 32( 1), 4,7 and 48 allow a party state to bring a case before the 
Court within three months from the date of transmission ofthe Commission's report to the Com-
mittee of Ministers. Convention, supra note 4, arts. 32(1), 47 & 48. 
The Irish Government was dissatisfied with the Commission's report for several reasons. The 
following specific points of disagreement were brought to light in the Irish Government's 
Memorial. Memorial of the Government of Ireland [hereinafter cited as Irish Memorial) (ob-
tainable from the European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France). 
(1) The Irish Government was still of the opinion that Article 1 can be the subject of a 
separate breach of the Convention. According to the Irish Government, the United 
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consider the report of the Commission and to confirm the opinion 
of the Commission that breaches of the Convention have occurred 
and also to consider the claims of the applicant Government with 
regard to other alleged breaches and to make a finding of breach of 
the Convention where the Court is satisfied that a breach has oc-
curred. 2tO 
3. The Proceedings Before the Court 
407 
On April 29, 1976, the Chambertl of seven judges which had been consti-
tuted to hear Ireland fl. the United Kingdom decided to relinquish its jurisdiction 
• • in favor of the plenary Court, • considering that the case raiser d] serious 
questions affecting the interpretation of the Convention.' "2t2 
The Court commenced the proceedings by requesting the submission of 
written memorials from the Irish Government, the United Kingdom Govern-
ment and the delegates of the Commission.2ts Subsequently, the Court con-
Kingdom was in breach of Article 1 for failing to secure within its jurisdiction the 
particular rights and freedoms guaranteed in Section I ofthe Convention. /d. at 4. 
(2) The Irish Government objected to the standard of proof applied by the Commission 
in its report, i.t., proof of the allegations made beyond a reasonable doubt, as being 
too rigid. Irish Memorial, s.",fJ, at 19. Sn Report, SU/JrfJ note 9, at 404. The appli· 
cant govern'ment stated that such a rigid standard of proof was "not necessarily ap-
propriate when the matter under consideration is an alleged failure by a State to 
comply with its obligations under an international convention." Irish Memorial, 
suprfJ, at 19. 
(3) The Irish Government maintained that the United Kingdom Government had 
failed to establish that the emergency powers were strictly required by the exigen-
cies of the situation within the meaning of Article 15. /d. at 51. 
(4) The Irish Government contended that the exercise of the emergency powers in-
volved a violation of Article 6(1). /d. at 52. 
(5) The Irish Government believed that the exercise of the emergency powers by the 
authorities was carried out with discrimination on the grounds of political opinion. 
ld. at 78. 
In addition, the Irish Government urged the Court to find further violations of Article 3 with 
reference to the treatment of persons held in custody between 1971 and 1974. /d. at 31. 
240. Judgment, suprfJ note 3, at 2. 
1141. Article 43 of the Convention states that: 
For the consideration of each case brought before it the Court shall consist of a 
Chamber composed of seven judges. There shall sit as an ex officio member of the 
Chamber the judge who is a national of any State party concerned, or, if there is 
none, a person of its choice who shall sit in the capacity of judge; the names of the 
other judges shall be chosen by lot by the President before the opening of the case. 
Convention, suprfJ note 4, art. 43. In the present case, the Chamber invoked Rule 48 of the Rules 
of Court to relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the plenary Court. Judgment, suprfJ note 3, at 2. 
242. /d. at 2. The plenary Court was composed as follows: G. Balladore Pallieri, President, G. 
Wiarda, M. Zekia,J. Cremona, P. O'Donoghue, H. Pedersen, ThorVilhjaImsson, R. Ryssdal, 
W. Ganshof van der Meersch, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, D. Bindschedler-Robert, D. Evrigenis, 
P.-H. Teitgen, G. Lagergren, L. Liesch, F. G61ciikJii, F. Matscher, and also M.-A. Eissen, 
Registrar and H. Petzold, Deputy Registrar. /d. at I. 
243. /d. at 2. 
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ducted two public hearings in February and April 1977.24+ Thereafter, the 
Court delivered its judgment on January 18, 1978.2+5 Like the Commission, 
the Court decided that, with respect to certain of the sixteen illustrative cases, 
several violations of Article 3 of the Convention2t6 had occurred. The Court 
found that certain persons, interrogated and/or detained in Northern Ireland 
during autumn of 1971, had been the subjects of a practice of inhuman treat-
ment,2t7 and in some cases inhuman and degrading treatment. H8 Unlike the 
Commission, the majority of the Court believed that none of the established 
breaches of Article 3 constituted torture. H9 
The Court agreed. with the Commission that further allegations of Conven-
tion breaches had not been established. In particular, the Court held that it 
had not been proven that the established derogations from Article 5250 were ex-
ceeded to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the emergency situa-
tion in Northern Ireland. 251 The Court also concluded that a discriminatory 
application of the emergency powers, contrary to Articles 5 and 14,252 had not 
been shown. 253 In addition, the Court did not consider it necessary to give a 
decision on the alleged violations of Article 6.25* However, the Court as-
sumed, without deciding, that Article 6 had not been violated. 255 
In its judgment, the Court addressed the issue of whether Article 1256 could 
be the subject of a separate breach and answered this question in the 
negative:m Finally, the Court ruled on whether Article 50,258 concerning 
244. /d. at 3, 4. During the first part of the oral hearings, held in February 1977, the Court 
concerned itself with jurisdictional issues. /d. at 3. During the oral pr~eedings held in April 
1977, the Court heard addresse's from the representatives of the applicant Government, the 
respondent Government and the Commission. /d . . at 5. 
245. /d. at 83. Annexed to the Judgment of the Court are the separate opinions of M. Zekia, 
id. at 84; P. O'Donoghue, id. at'88; Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, id. at 95; D. Evrigenis, id. at 117; 
and, F. Matscher, id. at 119. 
246. For the text of Article 3, see S IV.B.1 i'!fra. 
247. Judgment, supra note 3, at 82. 
248. /d. 
249. [d. 
250. For the relevant text of Article 5, see S IV.C.1 infra. 
251. Judgment, supra note 3, at 82. The decision on this issue involved the application of Arti-
cle 15(1). /d. For the text of Article 15(1), see S II.C.1 supra. 
252. For the text of Article 14, see S IV.D.1 i'!fra. 
253. Judgment, supra note 3, at 83. 
254. /d. at 77. For the relevant text of Article 6, see S IV.E infra. 
255: Judgment; supra note 3, at 77. 
256. For the text of Article 1, see S IV.F infra. 
257. Judgment, supra note 3, at 77-80. 
258. Convention, supra note 4, art. 50. Article 50 states that: 
[d. 
If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority, or any 
other authority of a High Contracting Party, is completely or partially in conflict 
with the obligations arising from the present Convention, and if the internal law of 
the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this 
decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfac-
tion to the injured party. 
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monetary compensation to individual victims of a breach of the Convention, 
should be applied to the case. The Court decided that it was not necessary to 
apply Article 50 since the Irish Government did not have as an object of its ap-
plication the obtaining of compensation for any individual person. 2~9 
B. The Decision Concerning Allegations oj /ll- Treatment and Torture: Article 3 
1. Introduction 
Article 3 of the Convention provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.' '260 This 
guarantee of Article 3 is absolute - no derogation from Article 3 is ever per-
mitted or justified, not even during an emergency situation threatening the 
life of a nation. 261 
In its application to the Commission, the Irish Government had alleged the 
ill-treatment and torture of persons detained at certain Regional Holding 
Centres in August and October of 1971. Some of these allegations centered on 
the use of the five techniques262 in aid of interrogation in depth at several un-
identified holding centers. 263 Other allegations concerned the treatment of de-
tainees held at Girdwood Park, Palace Barracks and miscellaneous other loca-
tions. 264 The majority of these allegations involved subjection to physical 
violence, including kickings and beatings. 265 The alleged ill-treatment at 
Ballykinler Regional Holding Centre consisted of compulsory exercises for 
prolonged periods of time. 266 
The Commission, when presented with evidence in the form of illustrative 
cases, had concluded, by unanimous vote, that the combined use of the five 
techniques constituted a practice267 of inhuman treatment and torture in 
breach of Article 3.268 As to the other forms of alleged ill-treatment, the Com-
mission unanimously had held that: 
(1) eleven persons had suffered inhuman, and in two cases de-
grading, treatment in violation of Article 3; 
259. Judgment, supra note 3, at 81, 83. In addition, the Court unanimously held that it could 
not, as requested by the Irish Government in a letter dated January 5, 1977, direct the United 
Kingdom Government to institute criminal or disciplinary proceedings against those members of 
the security forces who had committed the breaches of Article 3 nor against those who had con-
doned or tolerated such breaches. /d. at 62, 82. 
260. Convention, supra note 4, art. 3. 
261. S,e id. art. 15(2). &, also Judgment, supra note 3, at 56. 
262. For a discussion of the five techniques, see S III.A.2 supra. 
263. Judgment, supra note 3, at 36. 
264. /d. 
265. /d. at 39-44, 45-46. 
266. /d. at 44-45. 
267. For a discussion of the distinction between "practice in breach of Article 3" and "ad-
ministrative practice" (an important distinction when the case was before the Commission), see 
Report, supra note 9, at 379-88. See also McGovern, supra note 47. 
268. Report, supra note 9, at 490. 
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(2) there had been in the autumn of 1971, a practice in connection 
with the interrogation at Palace Barracks which constituted in-
human treatment in breach of Article 3; 
(3) no practice in breach of Article 3 had been found to exist in 
connection with general conditions at Girdwood Park in 
August 1971; and 
(4) a violation of Article 3 was not found with respect to the condi-
tions of detention at Ballykinler in August 1971. 269 
2. The Procedural Issues Addressed by the Court Under Article 3 
a. Preliminary Question on the Non-contested Violations of Article 3 
Before the Court, the United Kingdom did not contest the decision of the 
Commission with respect to breaches of Article 3.270 In addition, the United 
Kingdom Government gave its unqualified undertaking that the use of the five 
techniques would not be reintroduced as an aid to interrogation. 271 However, 
the United Kingdom argued that the Court has the power to decline jurisdic-
tion where the objective of an application has been accomplished or where ad-
judication on the merits would be devoid of purpose. 272 The United Kingdom 
claimed that this was the situation in Ireland v. the United Kingdom. According to 
the United Kingdom, the case was mootY' In support of this argument, the 
United Kingdom referred to (1) the official abandonment of the five tech-
niques in 1972; (2) the solemn promise not to reintroduce the five techniques; 
and (3) the other measures274 that were adopted by the United Kingdom to 
remedy and to prevent the recurrence of the various violations found by the 
Commission. 275 The Court took note of this commitment given by the United 
Kingdom and of the various measures adopted to prevent the recurrence of 
269. Id. at 490-91. 
270. Counter Memorial of the United Kingdom Government at 8 (obtainable from the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France); Judgment, sUpTa note 3, 
at 52. 
271. Judgment, supra note. 3, at 53. At the hearing held on February 8, 1977, the United 
Kingdom Attorney-General spoke on behalf of the United Kingdom Government when he made 
the following undertaking: 
/d. 
The Government ofthe United Kingdom [has) considered the question ofthe use of the 
"five techniques" with very great care and with particular regard to Article 3 of the 
Convention. They now give this unqualified undertaking, that the "five techniques" 
will not in any circumstances be reintroduced as an aid to interrogation. 
272. /d. at 52. 
273. See id. 
274. Such measures included the following: issuance of police and army instructions and 
directives on the arrest, interrogation and treatment of persons in custody, revitalization of the 
established procedures for handling complaints against the police and the army, the payment of 
compensation in many cases, and, the appointment of committees of inquiry. /d. at 37, 47-49. 
275. /d. at 52. 
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Convention violations; nevertheless, the Court unanimously concluded that it 
should render a decision on the non-contested violations of Article 3,276 
In so deciding, the Court fulfilled the broad purpose ofthe Convention, i.e., 
the maintenance and further realization of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms within the nations of Europe.277 As stated by the Court, its judg-
ments "serve not only to decide those cases brought before [it] but, more 
generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Con-
vention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the engage-
ments undertaken by them as Contracting Parties. "278 In its memorial, the 
Irish Government noted the continuing relevance of Ireland v. the United King-
dom. 279 The Irish Government maintained that "the Court will not merely be 
establishing whether in the past a breach of(the] Convention occurred, but its 
findings may well have practical consequences for the people of Northern 
Ireland in the future. "280 Indeed, the decision of the Court has ramifications 
far beyond the boundaries of Northern Ireland by providing an interpretation 
of the scope and purpose of the Convention. 
b. Preliminary QJustion on Certain Contested Violations of Article 3 
In its memorial, the Irish Government invited the Court to hold, unlike the 
Commission, that certain violations of Article 3 had occurred at Ballykinler 
and at numerous other locations in Northern Ireland from 1971 to 1974.281 
The United Kingdom Government contested the merits of this claim and also 
raised a preliminary question. 282 The United Kingdom argued that these 
allegations did not involve a practice in breach ofthe Convention; rather, they 
concerned individual cases in which effective domestic remedies were avail-
able. 2" Consequently, the United Kingdom maintained that these claims fell 
outside the scope of the allegation which had been asserted by the Irish 
Government and accepted by the Commission in its decision on admis-
sibility.28. In its decision on admissibility, the Commission had accepted the 
allegation that "the treatment of persons in custody ... constituted an ad-
ministrative practice in breach of Article 3. "285 
The Court acknowledged that the allegation which had been accepted by the 
Commission under Article 3 involved a general practice and not isolated in-
276. Itl. at 53. 
277. See Convention, sll/l'. note 4, Preamble. 
278. Judgment, •• note 3, at 53. 
279. Irish Memorial, s.",. note 239, at 2. 
280. Itl. 
281. Itl. at 30-31; Judgment, SU/"4 note 3, at 53. 
282. Judgment, SU/"4 note 3, at 54. 
283. 1tI. 
284. Itl. 
285. Itl. 
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dividual cases.286 However, the Court noted that "a practice contrary to the 
Convention [could] only result from individual violations."287 Consequently, 
the Court unanimously concluded that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of 
the individual cases of alleged breaches of Article 3 to the extent that the Irish 
Government introduced them as evidence establishing the existence of a prac-
tice. 288 
c. Preliminary Question on the Standard of Proof 
Before the Court, the Irish Government challenged the standard of proof 
which had been adopted by the Commission in its consideration of the alleged 
violations of Article 3. Relying on past case law, the Commission had applied 
the standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt. "289 The Irish Government 
argued that this standard was" excessively rigid" for the purposes of the pres-
ent case, especially in light of the seemingly uncooperative attitude of the 
United Kingdom before the Commission. 290 
The Court agreed with the Commission's approach and adopted the same 
standard of proof, bu t added that such proof may follow from "the coexistence 
of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted 
presumptions of fact. "291 The Court stated that it would also take into account 
the conduct of the parties while evidence was being obtained. 292 
3. The Substantive Issues Addressed by the Court Under Article 3 
a. The Unidentified Interrogation Center(s) 
The Court accepted the Commission's findings that in August and October 
of 1971, there existed a practice in.N orthern Ireland of applying the five tech-
niques against persons held in custody for purposes of interrogation. 293 The 
Court stated that "the five techniques were applied in combination, with pre-
meditation and for hours at a stretch; they caused, if not actual bodily injury, 
at least intense physical and mental suffering to the persons subjected thereto 
and also led to acute psychiatric disturbances during interrogation. "294 
The majority of the Court agreed with the Commission that the combined 
286. /d. 
287. /d. 
288. ld. 
289. ld. at 55. The Commission first applied this standard of proof in the Greek Case, (1969) 
V.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 196. 
290. Judgment, supra note 3, ai 56. According to the Court, the Commission had pointed out, 
in substance, that the United Kingdom Government did not always afford the Commission the 
desired assistance. ld. at 51. The Court "regretted" this attitude but did not make a specific find-
ing that the United Kingdom was uncooperative. /d. 
291. /d. at 56. 
292. /d. 
293. /d. at 57. 
294. /d. 
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use of the five techniques constituted inhuman and degrading treatment 
within the meaning of Article 3.295 However, the majority of the Court dis-
agreed with the Commission's uncontested conclusion that the combined use 
of the five techniques also constituted torture. 296 According to the Court, the 
distinction between "torture" and" inhuman or degrading treatment" lies in 
the intensity of the suffering that was inflicted. 297 The Court supported its 
opinion by quoting the definition of torture in the recently adopted United 
Nations Declaration on Torture. 298 That declaration defines torture as "an 
aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. "299 The Court maintained that the combined application of the 
five techniques did not result in suffering of the particular intensity and cruel-
ty implied by the word torture as that word was understood by the Court. '00 
Four of the seventeen judges sitting on the case disagreed with the 
majority's decision that the use of the five techniques did not constitute torture 
within the meaning of Article 3.301 None of the four dissenting judges was 
satisfied with the Court's definition of torture. Judge Zekia acknowledged that 
torture was an aggravated form of inhuman treatment, but he believed that 
the Court's definition was too objective. 302 Judge Zekia would apply a more 
subjective definition which would take into account "the nature of the ill-
treatment inflicted, the means and methods employed, the repetition and 
duration of such treatment, the age, sex and health condition of the person ex-
posed to it, [and] the likelihood that such treatment might injure the physical, 
mental and psychological condition of the person exposed. "'0' 
Judge O'Donoghue also agreed with the Court's basic argument that tor-
ture is a more severe type of inhuman treatment.30t However, like Judges 
Evrigenis and Matscher, Judge O'Donoghue thought that the Court had con-
strued its definition of torture too narrowly by confining the concept to its 
historical "medieval dungeon" forms.!05 As emphasized by Judges 
295. /d. Sir. Gerald Fitzmaurice, ajudge from the United Kingdom, was the sole dissenter on 
this issue. /d. at 95 (Fitzmaurice, ]., dissenting). According to Fitzmaurice, to call "the treat· 
ment involved by the use of the five techniques 'inhuman' is excessive and distorting, unless the 
term is being employed loosely and merely figuratively." /d. For similar reasons, he disagreed 
with the Court's opinion that the use of the five techniques was "degrading." [d. at 108·11. 
296. /d. at 57. 
297. /d. 
298. Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, 
U.N. Doc. AlRES/3452 (1976). 
299. [d. at 93. 
300. Judgment, sufJra note 3, at 57. 
301. See id.at 84 (Zekia, ]., dissenting); id. at 88 (O'Donoghue, ]., dissenting); id. at 117 
(Evrigenis,]., dissenting); id. at 119 (Matscher, J., dissenting). 
302. /d. at 84 (Zekia, ]., dissenting). 
303. [d. (Zekia,]., dissenting). 
304. /d. at 91 (O'Donoghue, J., dissenting). 
305. [d. at91 (O'Donoghue,]., dissenting). Seeid. at 118 (Evrigenis,J., dissenting); id. at 119 
(Matscher,]., dissenting). 
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O'Donoghue, Evrigenis and Matscher, torture takes on a much more subtle 
form within the context of today's refined technology. '06 
A close reading of the Court's judgment reveals that it was aware of the 
possibility that torture could result from mental abuse as well as from physical 
violence. The Court commented that the five techniques constituted inhuman 
and degrading treatment even though no "actual bodily injury" may have 
resulted. '07 The Court noted that mental, as well as physical, suffering 
evidenced the inhuman and degrading treatment which occurred when the 
five techniques were applied. '08 Consequently, it is surprising that the Court 
saw fit to overturn the Commission's uncontested finding of torture. Accord-
ing to Judge Zekia, whether or not the five techniques amounted to torture 
was an issue of fact which should have been left to the Commission. '09 
However, perhaps regrettably, the Court did not do so. As a result, the Court 
has limited, at least for the present, the scope and application of the protection 
afforded against torture by Article 3. 
The Court reviewed the evidence concerning the persons who had been sub-
jected to the five techniques and held, by sixteen votes to one, '10 that no-other 
practice in violation of Article 3 was established in relation to the unidentified 
interrogation center(s).m 
b. Palace Barrac/cs 
With regard to Palace Barracks, the Irish Government asked the Court to' 
confirm the Commission's finding of a practice which violated the guarantee 
in Article 3 against inhuman treatment in connection with interrogation dur-
ing the autumn of 1971.'12 The Court was also invited to supplement the 
Commission's finding by (1) holding that the practice complained of con-
tinued until June of 1972 when Palace Barracks was closedm and (2) holding 
that the practice constituted torture within the meaning of Article 3.314 
The Court confirmed the finding of the Commission. m In addition, the 
Court held, by fourteen votes to three, '16 that the practice at Palace B,arracks 
306. /d. at 91 (O'Donoghue, J., dissenting); id. at 118 (Evrigenis, J., dissenting); id. at 119 
(Matscher, J., dissenting). 
307. /d. at 57. 
308. /d. 
309. Id. at 86 (Zekia, J., dissenting). 
310. The sole dissenting vote was that of Judge O'Donoghue. /d. at 88 (O'Donoghue, J., 
dissenting). 
311. /d. at 58, 82. 
312. /d. at 58. 
313. /d. at 59. 
314. /d. 
315. /d. at 58. 
316. The three dissenting votes were those of Judge O'Donoghue, Judge Evrigenis, and Judge 
Matscher.ld. at 88 (O'Donoghue,J., dissenting); id at 117 (Evrigenis,J., dissenting); id. at 119 
(Matscher, J., dissenting). 
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in the autumn of 1971 was not one of torture within the meaning of Article 
3. m Finally, the Court unanimously decided that there was not sufficient 
evidence to establish that the practice of inhuman treatment continued beyond 
the autumn of 1971.318 
c. Other Places 
According to the claims of the Irish Government, and contrary to the 
holding of the Commission, a practice or practices in violation of Article 3 ex-
isted in Northern Ireland from 1971 to 1974 at such places as Ballykinler and 
Girdwood Park.m The United Kingdom denied this allegation before the 
Court. 320 
The Court first addressed the issue by examining the situation at Bally-
kinler, where it was alleged that detainees were compelled to undergo certain 
exercises.321 The Court acknowledged that the RUC and the army conducted 
a practice of forcing arrested persons at Ballykinler to perform "irksome and 
painful" exercises.522 Yet, the Court decided that this practice, although 
"discreditable and reprehensible," did not constitute an infringement of Arti-
cle 3.323 
The Court considered the evidence which suggested that other individual 
violations of Article 3 may have occurred at other places in Northern Ireland 
during the autumn of 1971.324 After considering this evidence, the Court 
agreed with the Commission's findings that such information was insufficient 
to support an allegation of a breach of Article 3. m 
C. The Decision Concerning Extrajudicial Deprivation oj Liberty: Articles 5 and 15 
1. Introduction 
Article 5 of the Convention consists of five paragraphs which, when taken 
together, guarantee an individual's right to liberty and security of person. 
Paragraphs one through four are relevant to the proceedings in Ireland v. the 
United Kingdom. 326 The first paragraph of Article 5 contains an exhaustive list 
317. Id. at 59. 
318. /d. 
319. /d. at 60. 
320. /d. 
321. /d. 
322. Id. 
323. /d. 
324. /d. at 61. 
325. /d. The decision on this issue was reached by a vote of fifteen to two. The dissenting votes 
were those of Judges O'Donoghue and Evrigenis. /d. at 88 (O'Donoghue, J., dissenting); id. at 
117 (Evrigenis, J., dissenting). 
326. Paragraph 5 of Article 5 states that "[e)veryone who has been the victim of arrest or 
detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to com-
pensation." Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(5). 
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of those instances in which it is permissible, under the Convention, to deprive 
an individual of his liberty. 327 Paragraphs two to four of Article 5 obligate 
states party to the Convention to provide several guarantees in cases where an 
individual is deprived of his liberty: 
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly in a lan-
guage which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of 
any charge against him. 
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provi-
sions of paragraph l(c) ofthis Article shall be brought promptly 
before a judge or other officer authori[z]ed by law to exercise 
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable 
time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by 
guarantees to appear for trial. 
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention 
shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of 
his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release 
ordered if the detention is not lawful. 328 
327. Paragraph one of Article 5 states: 
I. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. 
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by law: 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful 
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any. obligation prescribed 
bylaw; 
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him 
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having com-
mitted an offense or when it is reasonably considered necessary to' prevent his 
committing an offense of fleeing after having done so; 
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational super-
vision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the compe-
tent legal authority; 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious 
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; 
(I) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthori[z)ed entry into the country or a person against whom action is being 
taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 
!d. art. 5( 1). Both the Commission and the Court discussed the applicability of the various sub-
paragraphs of Article 5(1) to the present case and to the emergency legislation exercised in North-
ern Ireland from August 9, 1971 to March 1975. The Commission and the Court concluded that 
sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (d), (e) and (I) did not apply to arrest and detention under the emergency 
legislation in question. Report, supra note 9, at 88; Judgment, supra note 3, at 64. 
With regard to sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5(1), the Commission and the Court both found 
that many of the detentions made under the emergency legislation would have met its description 
if it were not for the connection between Article 5(IXc) and Article 5(3). Report, supra note 9, at 
88; Judgment, supra note 3, at 64-65. Considering Article 5(3) together with Article 5(IXc), the 
Court found that the extrajudicial measures were not effected for the purpose of bringing the per-
sons concerned "promptly" before the "competent legal authority." Judgment, supra note 3, at 
65. 
328. Convention, supra note 4, arts. 5(2), (3), (4). 
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In substance, the allegations of the Irish Government with respect to Ar-
ticles 5 and 15 were two-fold. First, it was alleged that the various powers 
relating to extrajudicial deprivation of liberty,329 exercised in Northern Ire-
land between August 9, 1971 and March 1975, m did not satisfy the conditions 
prescribed by Article 5.331 In addition, the Irish Government alleged that 
these powers violated Article 5 by failing to meet the requirement of Article 15 
that they be "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. "332 
The Commission, in its report, had acknowledged that the powers exercised 
under the emergency legislation in Northern Ireland were not in conformity 
with Article 5 of the Convention. 333 However, the Commission had cautioned 
that the finding of an actual breach of Article 5 depended on whether deroga-
tion from Article 5 was justified under Article 15 due to the emergency situa-
tion in Northern Ireland at the relevant time. 33+ The Commission eventually 
had concluded, by a unanimous vote, that the measures for detention without 
trial, although in derogation of Article 5, were "strictly required by the ex-
igencies of the situation" within the meaning of Article 15(1).535 
2. The Court's Interpretation of the Extrajudicial Powers 
in Relation to Article 5 
The Court conducted an examination of the powers relating to extrajudicial 
deprivation of liberty to determine whether such measures were in conformity 
with Article 5 of the Convention. m 
Upon arrest, Article 5(2) requires the prompt disclosure of the reasons for 
such arrest and of any charges against the arrested individual. m According to 
the Court, there was no such provision in either the regulations of the Special 
Powers Act or the Emergency Provisions Act. 338 The Court commented that 
persons arrested under either of these powers were not usually informed why 
they had been arrested; "in general, they were simply told that the arrest was 
made pursuant to the emergency legislation and they were given no further 
329. Set note 95 supra. 
330. The Irish Government did not ·ask the Court to render a decision concerning legislation 
in effect subsequent to March 1975. This was the date of the final hearings before the Commis-
sion. Judgment, supra note 3, at 62. The Court noted that the Emergency Provisions Amendment 
. Act, 1975, c. 62, reintroduced the principle of detention by order of the Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland. Judgment, supra note 3, at 62. The Court decided that an ex officio examina-
tion of the Emergency Provisions Amendment Act, which entered into force on August 21, 1975, 
was not necessary because the information available to the Court suggested that the detention 
provisions of that act had not been invoked since December 5, 1975. /d. 
331. [d. 
332. /d. 
333. Report, supra note 9, at 92. 
334. [d. 
335. Id. at 103. 
336. Judgment, supra note 3, at 64-67. 
337. Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(2). 
338. Judgment, supra note 3, at 65. 
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details."339 The Court found that this practice was not in conformity with Ar-
ticle 5(2)3tO and noted that this practice continued "at least until it was 
declared unlawful by the courts [of Northern Ireland].",t, 
The Court considered Article 5(3) in conjunction with Article 5(1)(c) and 
found that the three pieces of emergency legislation were not effected for the 
purpose of bringing arrested or detained persons "promptly" before the 
"competent legal authority. "3t2 The Court also found that the fundamental 
guarantees inherent in the notion of "court" as used in Article 5(4) were not 
provided under the Special Powers Act and its regulations, the Detention of 
Terrorists Order or the Emergency Provisions Act. 3t3 
In sum, the Court supported that the Commission's conclusion that the ex-
trajudicial powers exercised in Northern Ireland between August 9, 1971 and 
March 1975 were not in conformity with Articles 5(1)-5(4) of the Conven-
tion.3H 
3. The Necessity for Derogation from Article 5: The Court's 
Application of Article 15 
a. The Existence oj a Public Emergency 
After addressing some procedural matters,3t5 the Court considered the 
allegation of the Irish Government that the emergency powers relating to ex-
trajudicial deprivation of liberty constituted a violation of Article 5 because 
339. ld. 
340. ld. at 67. 
341. /d. at 65. See In Re McElduff, (1972) N.I. 1; Moore v. Shillington, (1972) N.I. 190; Kelly 
v. Faulkner, (1973) N.I. 31. 
342. Judgment, supra note 3, at 65. See also note 327 supra. 
343. Judgment, supra note 3, at 66. 
344. /d. at 67. 
345. The Irish Government requested that the Court exclude certain evidence from its ex-
amination of the issues under Article 15 because such evidence was heard in the absence of the 
parties and without the opportunity for cross-examination. /d. at 68-69. The information in ques-
tion had been gathered from three witnesses who were heard in London on February 20, 1975, 
during the proceedings before the Commission. /d. at 69. The Court found that it did not have 
jurisdiction to rule on the correctness of the procedure followed at a hearing which was conducted 
at the level ofthe proceedings before the Commission. "The Commission, with its independence 
from the Court when carrying out its fact-finding role, is master of its procedure and of the inter-
pretation of its Rules of Procedure ... which it draws up under Article 36 of the Convention." 
ld. 
The Court also cautioned that the limits on the Court's power of review are particularly ap-
parent where Article 15 is concerned: 
It falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for "the life 
of [its) nation," to determine whether that life is threatened by a "public emergency" 
and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emergency. By 
reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the 
national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to 
decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of 
derogations necessary to avert it. In this matter Article 15 S 1 leaves those authorities a 
wide margin of appreciation. 
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they were not "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" within the 
meaning of Article 15.346 
The Court noted that Article 15 is applicable only" in time of war or other 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation."347 The Court 
unanimously held that there existed in Northern Ireland from August 9, 1971 
to March 1975 a "public emergency threatening the life of the nation" within 
the meaning of Article 15(1).H8 The existence of an emergency situation was 
not questioned by either party before the Commission or the Court. m 
b. The Necessity for Extrajudicial Depn'vation of Liberty, 
Contrary to Article 5(1) 
The Court acknowledged that the exercise of the emergency powers in 
Northern Ireland was mainly350 directed against suspected members of the 
IRA and against those persons who might have possessed information con-
cerning the Republican organization.351 According to the Court, the intention 
of such a restricted application of the emergency powers was to "combat an 
organi[z]ation which had played a considerable subversive r[o]le throughout 
the recent history of [Northern] Ireland and which was creating ... a par-
ticularly far-reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the 
United Kingdom, the institutions ofthe six counties and the lives of the prov-
ince's inhabitants. "352 
In the Court's opinion, the Northern Ireland Government and, after the in-
troduction of direct rule in March of 1972, the British Government acted rea-
sonably when they resorted to extrajudicial measures in their attempt to con-
front the "wave of violence and intimidation. "353 
In its discussion of the necessity for derogation from Article 5(1), the Court 
Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect. The Court, 
which, with the Commission, is responsible for ensuring the observance of the States' 
engagements (Article 19), is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond 
the "extent strictly required by the exigencies" of the crisis .... The domestic margin 
of appreciation is thus accompanied by a European supervision. 
/d. at 68. 
346. For a discussion of Article 15, see S II.C supra. 
347. Judgment, supra note 3, at 68, quoting Convention, supra note 4, art. 15(1). 
348. /d. at 68, 82. 
349. /d. at 68. 
350. Before February 5, 1973, the emergency powers were applied exclusively against the IRA. 
/d. at 70. For a discussion of the allegation of discrimination, which concerns the one-sided ap-
plication of the emergency powers, see Section IV. D i'lfra. 
351. Judgment, supra note 3, at 70. . 
352. /d. 
353. /d. In a particularly interesting aside, the Court noted that: "[w]hen the Irish Republic 
was faced with a serious crisis in 1957, it adopted the same approach and the Court did not con-
clude that the 'extent strictly required' had been exceeded." [d. The Court was referring to the 
"Lawless" Case, [1961] V.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438. 
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made a particular reference to Regulation 10 of the Special Powers Act,m pre-
sumably due to the extraordinary nature of the deprivation of liberty allowed 
under that regulation. Under Regulation 10, even an individual who was not 
suspected of committing a crime or of engaging in activities prejudicial to the 
maintenance of peace and order could be arrested and detained for the 
singular purpose of obtaining information about others. m The Court main-
tained that such an arrest could be justified only in "a very exceptional situa-
tion. "356 The Court was of the opinion that such an exceptional situation ex-
isted in Northern Ireland at the relevant time stating that such arrests were 
"indispensable" in order to question witnesses without fear of reprisal357 and 
that the maximum limit of detention under Regulation 10 was 48 hours.358 
Without downplaying the existence of a real problem involving the intimi-
dation of witnesses,359 it is suggested that the Court over-emphasized the ac-
tual use of Regulation 10' s powers of arrest and detention to protect witnesses 
against fear of reprisal. It is more likely that such powers were employed as a 
means of intimidating and frightening innocent members of the general public 
as well as suspected members of the IRA. 
The Court decided that the limits of the margin of appreciation360 left to the 
states by Article 15(1) were not overstepped by the United Kingdom when it 
determined that extrajudicial deprivation of liberty was necessary during the 
period from August 9, 1971 to March 1975. 361 
c. The Necessity for Derogation from the Guarantees of Article 5(2)-(4) 
The Court conducted an examination of the extrajudicial legislation and 
practice under scrutiny and concluded that this legislation "evolved in the 
direction of increasing respect for individual liberty . "362 In so concluding, the 
Court seemed to regret that more satisfactory judicial, or at least administra-
tive, guarantees were not incorporated into the emergency legislation from the 
start when detention and internment were reintroduced in August of 1971.363 
The United Kingdom Government was excused for its failure to provide more 
adequate safeguards for the protection of human rights in the application of 
the emergency powers. 
When a State is struggling against a public emergency threatening 
354. See note 95 supra. 
355. Id.; see Judgment, supra note 3, at 70. 
356. Judgment, supra note 3, at 70. 
357. Id. 
358. Id. 
359. See id. at 12. 
360. See note 82 supra. 
361. Judgment, supra note 3, at 71. 
362. Id. at 71·72. 
363. ld. at 72. 
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the life of the nation, it would be rendered defen[sJeless if it were 
required to accomplish everything at once, to furnish from the 
outset each of its chosen means of action with each of the safe-
guards reconcilable with the priority requirements for the proper 
functioning of the authorities and for restoring peace within the 
community. 364 
4-21 
In the opinion of the Court, the interpretation of Article 15 leaves sufficient 
room for "progressive adaptations. "365 
Progressive adaptations are what the United Kingdom Government 
achieved in Northern Ireland during the 1970's when it repealed, passed and 
amended several pieces of emergency legislation. 366 These legislative measures 
were taken, for the most part, in response to the recommendations of govern-
ment-appointed commissions of inquiry. 367 The question arises whether such 
legislation should have been more progressively adapted, especially in light of 
the United Kingdom's obligation under the Convention to protect human 
rights. The Court addressed this question but decided that it could not given 
an affirmative answer. 368 
According to the Court, in view of the emergency situation in Northern 
Ireland and of the margin of appreciation left to the states under Article 15, 
the derogations from Article 5(2)-5(4) were justified and did not exceed the 
"extent strictly required. "369 The Court's holding on this issue was disputed 
by Judge O'Donoghue. In his separate opinion, Judge O'Donoghue main-
tained that the invocation by the Court of the margin of appreciation princi-
ple, in favor of the United Kingdom, amounted to a "blanket exculpation" 
for many actions which could not be reconciled with the observance of obliga-
tions imposed by the Convention. 370 Although Judge O'Donoghue agreed 
that the situation in Northern Ireland justified derogation from Article 5, he 
believed that the departures taken went beyond the "extent stn'ctty required by 
the exigencies of the situation. "371 
d. The Satisfaction of the Other Requirements of Article 15 
Paragraph three of Article 15 requires a derogating state "to keep the Secre-
tary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures it has 
364-. /d. 
365. /d. 
366. This legislation included the Special Powers Act, the Detention of Terrorists Order, the, 
Emergency Provisions Act, and the Emergency Provisions Amendment Act. Se, notes 95 & 218 
supTa. 
367. Se, n III.B, C, F.2, G.2 supTa. 
368. Judgment, supra note 3, at 72. 
369. Id. 
370. Id. at 92 (O'Donoghue, J., dissenting). 
371. Id. (emphasis supplied). 
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taken and the reasons therefor. "372 By a unanimous vote, the Court held that 
the United Kingdom's notices of derogation from Article 5 of the Convention 
properly fulfilled the requirements of Article 15(3). m The Court also held that 
the United Kingdom Government had not disregarded other obligations 
under international law within the meaning of Article 15(1).374 In sum, the 
Court concluded that, because all of the requirements of Article 15 were met, 
the derogations from Article 5 were not in breach of the Convention. 375 
D. The Decision Concerning Discrimination: Articles 5 and 14 
1. Introduction 
The Irish Government alleged a further breach of the Convention with 
respect to Article 5 involving the application of Article 14, which provides that 
"[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall 
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, [color], 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. "376 
The Irish Government claimed that the emergency powers relating to extra-
judicial deprivation of liberty were exercised in a discriminatory manner in 
violation of Article 14. 377 The facts before the Commission had established 
that before February 5, 1973, the extrajudicial powers were used only against 
individuals suspected of involvement in IRA terrorist activities. 378 After 
February 5, 1973, the emergency powers were also employed against 
suspected Loyalist terrorists, but to a far lesser extent. 379 The Commission had 
unanimously held that the emergency powers had not been applied in breach 
of Article 14.380 
2. The Period Prior to February 5, 1973 
The Court began its review of the allegation of discrimination by accepting 
the Commission's finding that a difference in the treatment of Republican as 
opposed to Loyalist terrorism existed in Northern Ireland as early as 1971.381 
The Court found that there were "profound" differences between Loyalist 
and Republican terrorism. 382 
372. Convention, supra note 4, art. 15(3). 
373. Judgment, supra note 3, at 73. 
374.Id. 
375. /d. One judge dissented on this point. /d. at 88, 92-93 (O'Donoghue, J., dissenting). 
376. Convention, supra note 4, art. H. 
377. Judgment, supra note 3, at 62. 
378. /d. at 74. 
379. /d. 
380. Report, supra note 9, at 220. 
381. See Judgment, supra note 3, at 74. 
382. /d. Three factors were cited by the Court to explain why the emergency powers were used 
exclusively against Republican terrorism prior to February 5, 1973: 
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According to the Court, when the United Kingdom assumed direct rule of 
Northern Ireland in March 1972, it desired to combat the discrimination long 
prevalent there with respect to electoral rights, employment and housing. 383 
The Court commented that this approach did not result in that which might 
have been expected, i. t., a complete equality of treatment between Loyalist 
and Republican terrorists. 384 Shortly after the introduction of direct rule, 
there was a vast increase in Loyalist terrorism. 385 In addition, the Loyalist ter-
rorist organizations expanded in membership and developed structurally. 386 
Yet, "a surprising time-lag" of ten months elapsed before the first two 
Loyalists were extrajudicially deprived of their liberty on February 5, 1973.387 
The reasons advanced by the Commission and the United Kingdom in ex-
planation of this ten month lag consisted of (1) the decision to attempt to phase 
out detention and internment; (2) the fact that the large majority of serious 
acts of terrorism were still attributable to the IRA; and (3) the notion that the 
ordinary criminal processes remained far more suited to the campaign against 
Loyalist terrorism. 388 The Court stated that although these reasons were in-
fluential before the introduction of direct rule, they became less valid as time 
progressed.389 The Court continued: 
However, the Court considers it unrealistic to carve into clear-
cut phases a situation that was inherently changing and constantly 
evolving. The Court can understand the authorities' hesitating 
about the course to take, feeling their way and needing a certain 
time to try to adapt themselves to the successive demands of an 
ugly crisis.390 
Consequently, the Court refused to make a determination of a violation of Ar-
ticle 14, taken together with Article 5, regarding the United Kingdom's appli-
cation of the emergency powers exclusively against the IRA prior to February 
5, 1973.391 
(I) The vast majority of murders, explosions and other violence was attributable to 
Republicans. The Loyalists were also perpetrators of violence, but the scale of their 
activities was insignificant when compared with those of the IRA. 
(2) The IRA, then a far more structured organization, imposed a far more serious 
threat than the Loyalist terrorists. At thal'time, Loyalist terrorism was viewed as 
the sporadic work of individuals or isolated factions. 
(3) As a general rule, Loyalist terrorists were easier to criminally prosecute than their 
Republican counterparts. The Loyalists, although not extrajudicially deprived of 
their liberty, do not seem to have been able to act with impunity. 
Id. at 74-75. 
383. /d. at 75. 
384. /d. 
385. /d. 
386. See id. 
387. /d. 
388. /d. 
389. Id. 
390. /d. 
391. /d. 
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3. The Period After February 5, 1973 
The first two Loyalist terrorists were subjected to the emergency powers on 
February 5, 1973.392 After that date, extrajudicial deprivation of liberty was 
used to combat terrorism generally and was no longer directed at a specific ter-
rorist organization. 393 
In actuality, the emergency powers continued to be applied against 
Republican terrorists to a much greater extent than against Loyalist 
terrorists. 394 However, with respect to the period after February 5, 1973, the 
Court concluded that the initial difference in treatment did not continue if the 
full range of processes of the law applied against the two categories of terrorists 
are taken into account. 395 
Accordingly, the Court held, by fifteen votes to two, that discrimination 
contrary to Articles 14 and 5 taken together had not been established. 396 The 
first criticism of the Court's conclusion is the apparent ease with which the 
Court was willing to equate extrajudicial deprivation of liberty with depriva-
tion of liberty effected through the ordinary criminal process. Unless the 
Court was referring to "justified" extrajudicial deprivation of liberty within 
the context of the right of derogation in Article 15, its equation of the various 
means by which deprivation of liberty can be achieved seems erroneous in 
light of the purposes of the Convention. m It must be assumed that the Court 
was delivering its judgment on the discrimination issue in conjunction with its 
holding on the Article 15 issue. 
E. The Holding Concerning Article 6 
In its claims regarding Article 6 of the Convention, the Irish· Government 
raised allegations which paralleled those made under Article 5. Specifically, it 
was alleged that the various powers concerning extrajudicial deprivation of 
liberty, used in Northern Ireland from August 9, 1971 to March 1975, (1) did 
not meet the requirements set forth in Article 6; (2) violated 6 as they did not 
fully satisfy the conditions of Article 15; and (3) violated Article 14, taken 
together with Article 6, because they were implemented in a discriminatory 
manner.398 
Article 6 protects an individual's right to a fair and public trial. It provides 
in paragraph one that "[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obliga-
392. /d. at 21. 
393. /d. at 76. 
394./d. 
395. /d. During this period the IRA was still to blame for the majority of the violence. The 
Court noted that it was still easier to bring Loyalist terrorists before the courts. /d. 
396. ld. 
397. Set S II.A supra. 
398. Judgment, supra note 3, at 76. 
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tions or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law." 399 
Before the Commission and the Court, the Irish Government alleged that 
Article 6( 1) had been violated, with respect to the Special Powers Act, due to 
the absence of any adequate detention procedures during the operation of that 
act. +00 The Irish Government acknowledged that detention and internment 
under the Special Powers Act did not involve the determination of a criminal 
charge within the meaning of Article 6(1).+01 However, the Irish Government 
did claim that the decision to detain or intern involved the determination of a 
civil right, i. t., the right to liberty. +02 The Irish Government also maintained 
that the procedures followed under the Detention of Terrorists Order and the 
Emergency Provisions Act amounted to the determination of a civil right, if 
not a criminal charge, of "terrorism. "+03 
The United Kingdom's position before the Commission and the Court was 
that the exercise of the emergency powers involved an executive or admini-
strative act beyond the scope of Article 6. +0+ The Commission had agreed with 
the United Kingdom's argument that Article 6 does not apply to the extra-
judicial powers under scrutiny. +05 
/d. 
The Court recognized that a dispute existed over whether Article 6 was ap-
399. Convention, supra note 4, art. 6(1). Article 6 continues: 
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from 
all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a 
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection ofthe private life of 
the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in 
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offen[s)e shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law. 
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offen[s)e has the following minimum rights: 
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, 
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defen[ s)e; 
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, 
if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free 
when the interests of justice so require; 
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attend-
ance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him; 
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak 
the language used in court. 
400. Report, supra note 9, at 74. For a discussion of the detention and internment procedures 
under the Special Powers Act, set note 95 supra. 
401. Report, supra note 9, at 74. 
402. ld. 
403. /d. at 75. For a discussion of such procedures, stt U III.F.l, G.l supra. 
404. Report, supra note 9, at 75. 
405. Id. at 94. 
426 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. III, No.2 
plicable at all. 406 The Court summarily determined that it was not necessary 
for it to render a decision on the issue. 407 
F. The Decision Concerning Article 1 
The laws in force in Northern Ireland from August 9, 1971 to March 1975 
did not explicitly prohibit violations of the rights and freedoms protected by 
the Convention. In fact, the Irish Government argued that several of such 
laws, in addition to certain administrative practices, authorized or permitted 
such violations.408 According to the final submission of the Irish Government, 
the United Kingdom was in breach of an interstate obligation that was 
separate from its obligations toward individuals. 409 The Irish Government 
alleged that this separate breach arises from the obligation of Article 1, which 
provides that "[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of [the] Conven-
tion.' '410 
Both the United Kingdom Government and the Commission disagreed 
with this novel argument of the Irish Government.41I In fact, the Commission 
had held that Article 1 could not be the subject of a separate breach because it 
grants no rights in addition to those provided in Section I of the Conven-
tion.412 
The Court agreed that Article 1 could not be the subject of a separate 
breach. The Court explained that Article 1 helps to outline the boundaries of 
the Convention and is one of the articles which attests to the binding character 
of the Convention.413 In the Court's interpretation ofthe Convention, Article 
1 was drafted with reference to the provisions contained in Section I. Thus, it 
takes effect only in conjunction with those provisions.4l4 Consequently, a 
violation of Article 1 follows automatically from a breach of any of the provi-
406. Judgment, supra note 3, at 77. 
407. /d. The Court continued: 
However, assuming Article 6 to be material, the derogations from the guarantees of a 
judicial nature afforded by Article 5 perforce involved derogating from those afforded 
by Article 6. The Court has already held that the derogations from Article 5 met the re-
quirements of Article 15; in the circumstances of the case, it arrives at the same conclu-
sion as regards the derogations from Article 6. In addition, the Court has held that no 
discrimination contrary to Articles 14 and 5 taken together is established; it likewise 
finds no discrimination with respect to Article 6. 
Id. Two dissenting votes were cast by Judges O'Donoghue and Matscher, with respect to the 
Court's holding that there was no violation of Article 14, taken together with Article 6. /d. at 88 
(O'Donoghue, J., dissenting); id. at 120 (Matscher, J., dissentinjt). 
408. /d. at 77. 
409. Id. 
410. Convention, supra note 4, art. 1. 
411. Judgment, supra note 3, at 78. 
412. Report, supra note 9, at 485. 
413. Judgment, supra note 3, at 78. 
414.Id. 
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sions of Section I. +IS In other words, a law cannot be challenged in the 
abstract. 416 With its decision on the issues raised under Article I, the Court 
concluded its task of reviewing Ireland v. the United Kingdom. 
G. The Resolution oj the Committee of Ministers 
The Court transmitted its judgment to the Committee of Ministers in com-
pliance with Article 54 of the Convention. m The Committee of Ministers 
then supervised its execution. On June 27, 1978, the Committee of Ministers 
adopted its resolution concerning the judgment of the Court in Ireland v. the 
United Kingdom. 418 
In preparing its resolution, the Committee of Ministers invited the United 
Kingdom Government to inform it of the measures which it had taken as a 
result of the judgment. U9 The United Kingdom complied with this request. 420 
The United Kingdom response consisted of three points: 
(1) The fourteen men who were the victims of the practice of in-
human and/or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 
had brought civil actions for damages in the High Court of 
Northern Ireland and had received compensation therefor. 
The Prime Minister announced in March 1972 that the five 
techniques would no longer be used as an aid to interrogation. 
In February 1977, the Court took formal notice of the solemn 
undertaking by the Attorney General to the same effect. 
(2) Although the Court also found that there was, in autumn 
1971, a practice ofinhuman treatment in breach of Article 3 in 
connection with interrogation of detainees at Palace Barracks, 
it was not established that this practice continued thereafter. 
(3) The Court noted that a series of measures were adopted from 
1971 onwards to guarantee that detainees would be properly 
treated in the future. Such measures included medical examin-
ations of persons held in custody, strict instructions to the 
security forces concerning the treatment of persons held in 
custody and rigorous procedures for investigating com-
plaints. 421 
Taking note of this information supplied by the United Kingdom Govern-
ment, the Committee of Ministers declared in its resolution that it had exer-
415. /d. However, Article 1 adds nothing to a breach of any of these provisions. /d. 
416. /d. at 79. 
417. See Convention, supra note 4, art. 54. 
418. Resolution, supra note 3. 
419. /d. at 652. Under Article 53, the United Kingdom was obligated to abide by the judg-
ment. See Convention, supra note 4, art. 53. 
420. See Resolution, supra note 3, App. at 652. 
421. ld. at 652, 654. 
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cised its function under Article 54 ofthe Convention with regard to the present 
case.+22 
H. An Overview of the Court's Decision 
The European Court of Human Rights faced an enormous undertaking 
when it was presented with Ireland v. the United Kingdom. The Court was con-
fronted with three major tasks. First, it had to render a decision concerning 
the appropriate balance, under the Convention, between the protection of 
human rights and the traditional prerogative of a state to deal with an 
emergency situation in a manner which necessitates the infringement of 
human rights and freedoms. Not only did the Court have to strike this delicate 
balance, but it had to do so amidst a continuing, violent and highly volatile 
political situation. In addition, the Court was required to apply the articles of 
the relatively new Convention in reaching its decision. This process involved 
the interpretation of, and reference to, the prior case law arising under the 
Convention. Finally, the Court had the broader task of interpreting the Con-
vention itself. The Court bears the responsibilities of further outlining the 
scope of the Convention and of clarifying the meaning of its provisions. 
With regard to the Court's first task of balancing a state's obligation under 
the Convention to protect human rights against that state's right to suspend 
such obligations in the midst of a public emergency, the Court seems to have 
reached the appropriate, if not desirable, balance in consideration of the cir-
cumstances in Northern Ireland. Unfortunately, the political realities of the 
situation in Northern Ireland prevented the United Kingdom from fully ob-
serving its obligations under the Convention in the present case. However, the· 
decision in this case is not without merit. It portends a further erosion of the 
doctrines of necessity and state sovereignty, with respect to derogations from 
human rights protection. 
The Court approached its second task of applying prior case law to the facts 
of Ireland v. the United Kingdom with little difficulty. m The Court was able to 
draw upon previous decisions in rendering its decision concerning most of the 
allegations examined, especially in connection with those claims alleging viola- . 
tions of Articles 1, 5, 14 and 15.m In so doing, the Court generally used the 
prior case law to limit its power of review and the scope of the Convention's 
application. +25 Whether or not this was a desirable outcome remains to be 
seen. 
422. /d. at 652. 
423. The scope of this Comment does not include a detailed discussion or explanation of the 
Court's application of its prior case law to the facts and law in Ireland v. tM United Kingdom. For an 
analysis of the case involving such a discussion, see Article, Case of Ireland v. tM United Kingdom: 
Misrule on Trial, 3 A.S.l.L.S. INT'L L. J. 1 (1979). 
424. See Judgment, supra note 3, at 64, 66, 68·69, 74, 78. 
425. See, e.g., id. at 68 (Court has limited powers of review); id. at 69 (Court has no jurisdiction 
1980) IRELAND V. THE UNITED KINGDOM 429 
In light of the preceding discussion and with a view to the third task of the 
Court, it must be kept in mind that the Court was exercising its important 
responsibility of interpreting a relatively new instrument of international 
dimension. The Court was involved in interpreting the limits of the Conven-
tion for the present and in clarifying its scope for the future. 
V. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Additional Reports oj Human Rights Violations 
The effect ofthe Court's 1978 judgment upon the United Kingdom's future 
handling of the situation in Northern Ireland has been challenged. Despite the 
judgment of the Court with respect to breaches of the protection under Article 
3 against inhuman and degrading treatment, and contrary to the United 
Kingdom's affirmance before the Committee of Ministers that "a series of 
measures were adopted from 1971 onwards to ensure that prisoners would in 
the future be properly treated,' '426 it is apparent that human rights violations 
continue to exist in Northern Ireland. Most ofthese alleged violations concern 
the treatment of persons interrogated at Northern Ireland's holding centers on 
suspicion of involvement in terrorist-related activities.427 
Some recent reports support the claims that violations of human rights, as 
protected under the Convention, continue to occur. One such report is the 
result of an investigation conducted by the Amnesty International during the 
autumn of 1977 .428 Amnesty International released its report inJune of 1978, 
just five months after the Court had delivered its judgment. m The report ex-
amined 78 individual cases of alleged mistreatment from both Republican and 
Loyalist prisoners. 430 
to rule on correctness of procedure followed before Commission as Commission is independent 
from the Court when carrying out its fact-finding role); id. at 74 (Court sees no reason for depart-
ing from prior case law concerning the criteria used by the Court in applying Article 14); id. at 78 
(Court has never held that Article 1 is violated where it finds a breach of the provisions in Section 
I of the Convention). 
426. Resolution, supra note 3, App. at 654. 
427. AMNESlY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESlY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO NOR· 
THERN IRELAND (28 NOVEMBER-6 DECEMBER 1977) at 2-4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AI 
REPORT: 1978). For a discussion of the various individuals, groups and non-governmental. 
organizations which have investigated and/or publicized such allegations of ill-treatment, see id. 
at 3-4. 
428. During 1976, Amnesty International received a number of allegations of ill-treatment by 
the security forces in Northern Ireland. /d. at 8. These allegations continued to reach Amnesty 
International and, consequently, it decided to send a research mission to Northern Ireland. [d. 
The Amnesty International Mission was restricted to investigating specific allegations concerning 
persons in the custody of the RUC, rather than more general charges of human rights violations. 
/d. 
429. SttJudgment, supra note 3, at 83. 
430. AI REPORT: 1978, supra note 427, at 10. Of the total 78 cases examined by the Amnesty 
International Mission, direct testimony was heard from 52 individuals who claimed that they had 
been mistreated while in police custody. /d. at 9. 
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The alleged ill-treatment was both mental and physical. 431 Many of the al-
legations were in reference to interrogations conducted at Castlereagh Hold-
ing Centre.432 According to the Amnesty International Report, the response 
by the RUC authorities to these allegations was that: 
(1) the allegations constitute part of a "propaganda campaign" 
against the RUC, intended to defeat its aim of improving its 
reputation throughout the province; 
(2) the allegations are made with a view towards obtaining acquit-
tal before the courts on the grounds that self-incriminating 
statements - frequently the only evidence against suspected 
terrorists which can be produced in court - were made under 
duress; and 
(3) some of the allegations actually involved self-inflicted 
wounds. 433 
In its conclusion, the report recommended that a "public and impartial in-
quiry" be conducted to investigate the allegations of maltreatment. 434 
Such a committee of inquiry was established by the United Kingdom 
Government in the summer of 1978 following the publication of the Amnesty 
International report. This committee, the Bennett Committee, was authorized 
to report on RUC interrogation procedures in general, rather than to in-
vestigate individual cases in depth. m In addition, the Bennett Committee was 
authorized to examine the operation of the existing procedures for dealing 
with the complaints against the police. 456 
/d. 
The Bennett Report was made public in March of 1979.437 The Bennett 
The delegates [of the Amnesty International Mission) also examined medical reports 
relating to 13 of the 52 cases, and 5 of the 52 agreed at the request of the delegates to be 
further examined in greater detail by the medical members of the mission. In addition 
to obtaining testimony directly from the [52) persons, the delegates also examined 
medical reports and other apparently corroborative data in relation to a further 26 cases 
of alleged maltreatment. . 
431. Id. at 4. The physical methods of alleged ill-treatment included: "beatings, attempted 
strangulation, pressure to sensitive points of the body, bending of limbs, prolonged standing or 
squatting in awkward positions, prolonged physical exercises, and burning with cigarettes." /d. 
The alleged mental methods of ill-treatment included: "prolonged oppressive questioning by 
teams, threats of death and of imprisonment, and threats to the family of the suspect, stripping, 
and verbal abuse and humiliation." /d. 
432. /d. at 4. For an effective, although slightly sensational, compilation of allegations of ill-
treatment with reference to Castlereagh, Stt D. FAUL & R. MURRAY, THE CASTLEREAGH FILE: 
ALLEGATIONS OF RUC BRUTALITY 1976/1977 (1978) (this book may be obtained from the Irish 
National Caucus, Inc., 228 Second Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., 20003). 
433. AI REPORT: 1978, supra note 427, at 4-5. 
434. Id. at 70. 
435. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO POLICE INTERROGATION PROGEDURES 
IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CMD. No. 7497, at iv, (Gr. Britain 1979). The Bennett Committee was 
chaired by Judge H. G. Bennett. 
436. Stt id. at iv. 
437. Id. at i. 
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Committee based its findings on medical, oral and written evidence received 
from the RUC authorities.+38 The lengthy and thorough report ofthe Bennett 
Committee contains numerous recommendations for the improvement of pro-
cedures concerning police interrogation and the handling of complaints 
against police in Northern Ireland. m 
The most important conclusion of the Bennett Committee, with regard to 
the allegations of RUC ill-treatment, is its finding that persons had received 
injuries while in police custody which were not self-inflicted. HO The Bennett 
Committee commented that what it had found "reinforces the concern shown 
by the doctors and the Police Authority, and demonstrates the need for an im-
provement in the supervision and control of interrogation. "4+. In addition, 
the Bennett Committee noted that 
the fact that the United Kingdom was the subject of(the] adverse 
judgment [of the European Court of Human Rights in Ireland v. the 
United Kingdom] emphasi[z]es the point that the [honor] and good 
name of this country, as well as domestic law and the observance 
for their own sake of human rights recogni[ z]ed in the interna-
tional instruments to which the United Kingdom is a party, re-
quire continuing vigilance in the matter of interrogation of 
prisoners. 442 
The findings of the Bennett Committee are supported by the statement of 
Dr. Robert Irwin, a police surgeon in Northern Ireland. In March 1979, Dr. 
Irwin claimed that over 150 suspected terrorists whom he had examined at 
Castlereagh over the preceding three years had been "physically ill-treated" 
during interrogation by members of the RUC.'" 
The Amnesty International Report, the Bennett Report and the statement 
of Dr. Irwin all support the claims of further and continuing violations of 
human rights in Northern Ireland. In this respect, the work of the Court and 
of the Commission is not yet completed. In fact, the Commission recently was 
presented with an application concerning the conditions of imprisonment in 
Northern Ireland.H4 Having recently considered extrajudicial deprivation of 
liberty and practices of ill-treatment in connection with such extrajudicial 
measures in Northern Ireland, the Commission, and perhaps eventually the 
Court, must now investigate the allegations of mistreatment emanating from 
the prisons of Northern Ireland. 
438. /d. at 2-4. The Bennett Committee heard a total of 58 witnesses. /d. at 3. The investiga-
tion conducted by the Bennett Committee was confined, largely, to 1977 and 1978. /d. at 5. 
439. /d. at 50-95, 112-34. Set "Summary of Principal Conclusions and Recommendations," 
Id. at 135-40. 
440. St. id. at 55. 
441. /d. 
442. /d. at 51. 
443. Ulster no,to,&ys IRA Suspects Maimed in Police Custody, Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 1979, S A, at 
29, col. 1. 
444. B,itish Inquiry Finds Abus. in Ulster, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 1979, S A, at 11, cols. 1,4. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Court failed to find that the emergency powers involving the extra-
judicial deprivation of liberty were applied in a discriminatory manner against 
members of the minority population between August 1971 and March 1975. 
The Court's decision on this issue is questionable. The general policy of dis-
crimation against members of the minority population was the motivating 
force of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland in the late 1960's. It 
was this movement and the reaction to it by members of the majority popula-
tion which subsequently led to the violence and terrorist activities of the 
1970's. The extrajudicial measures were then introduced to combat such ter-
rorism and violence. The facts before the Commission and the Court support 
the conclusion that the authorities in Northern Ireland exercised such mea-
sures almost exclusively against suspected terrorists who were members of the 
minoriry population. This one-sided application of extrajudicial powers was in-
troduced and continued, even though terrorism that was attributed to 
members of the majoriry population existed at that time, and eventually 
escalated to a level approximating that of members of the minority population. 
This Comment has examined the judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights in /relo.nd v. the United Kingdom. In its decision, the Court af-
firmed, in part, the findings of the European Commission of Human Rights. 
The Court held that there existed a practice of inhuman and, in some cases, a 
practice of inhuman and degrading treatment with respect to individuals held 
in custody in Northern Ireland during autumn of 1971. However, the majori-
ty of the Court refused to accept the Commission's holding that such treat-
ment also involved the use of torture. 
The Court's determination that no suffering of the particular intensity and 
cruelty implied by the word "torture" resulted from the application of certain 
methods of interrogation was wrong. The Commission's uncontested finding of 
torture should have been upheld. The facts presented in the hearings before 
the Commission indicated that the means of interrogation employed in North-
ern Ireland during the autumn of 1971, especially the" five techniques, " con-
stituted torture. This determination of fact was not contested by the United 
Kingdom. In light of the Court's limited power of review and the discretion 
afforded to the Commission's determination offact, the Court should not have 
interfered with the Commission's findings of fact. 
The only aspect of the Court's decision that favored the protection of 
human rights in Northern Ireland was the determination that a practice of in-
human treatment had occurred in contravention of Article 3. Even this limited 
extension of human rights has been diminished by the apparent continuation 
of practices of inhuman treatment. 
Deirdre E. Donahue 
